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PERSONALIZING DEFAULT RULES AND
DISCLOSURE WITH BIG DATA
Ariel Porat*
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz**
This Article provides the first comprehensive account of personalized default
rules and personalized disclosure in the law. Under a personalized approach to
default rules, individuals are assigned default terms in contracts or wills that
are tailored to their own personalities, characteristics, and past behaviors.
Similarly, disclosures by firms or the state can be tailored so that only infor-
mation likely to be relevant to an individual is disclosed and information
likely to be irrelevant to her is omitted. The Article explains how the rise of Big
Data makes the effective personalization of default rules and disclosure far
easier than it would have been during earlier eras. The Article then shows how
personalization might improve existing approaches to the law of consumer
contracts, medical malpractice, organ donation, inheritance, landlord–tenant
relations, and labor law.
The paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it shows how
data mining can be used to identify particular personality traits in individu-
als, and these traits may in turn predict preferences for particular packages of
legal rights. Second, it proposes a regime whereby a subset of the population
(“guinea pigs”) is given a lot of information about various contractual terms
and plenty of time to evaluate their desirability, with the choices of particular
guinea pigs becoming the default choices for those members of the general
public who have similar personalities, demographic characteristics, and pat-
terns of observed behavior. Third, we assess a lengthy list of drawbacks to the
personalization of default rules and disclosure, including cross subsidization,
strategic behavior, uncertainty, stereotyping, privacy, and institutional-com-
petence concerns. Finally, we explain that the most trenchant critiques of the
disclosure strategy for addressing social ills are really criticisms of impersonal
disclosure. Personalized disclosure not only offers the potential to cure the ills
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associated with impersonal disclosure strategies, but it can also ameliorate
many of the problems associated with the use of personalized default rules.
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Introduction
Law is impersonal. The state generally does not tailor the contents of the
law to people’s characteristics and traits. In this Article, we argue that in the
era of Big Data, law should become more personalized. Our main focuses
are default rules (situations where people face a choice between sticking with
a default option or specifying a different option instead) and disclosure
(where the law mandates that individuals receive particular information).
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Our claim has important applications to contract law, consumer law, inheri-
tance law, medical malpractice, property law, labor law, privacy law, organ
donation law, and other fields.
Let us illustrate our approach with an example from inheritance law.
Empirical research has shown that married fathers are more likely than mar-
ried mothers to bequeath all their property to their spouses (55% compared
to 34%).1 Moreover, according to these studies, men bequeath significantly
larger shares of their estates to their spouses (80% of estates are willed to
widows versus 40% to widowers).2 These data are consistent with rational-
choice models of behavior: wives trust their husbands less than husbands
trust their wives to use inherited resources in the best interests of their mu-
tual children, since men are significantly more likely to remarry and devote
resources to the children from their second marriage, which comes at the
expense of children from their first marriage.3
If men’s testamentary preferences differ systematically from women’s,
why should intestacy laws continue to be gender neutral?4 Why not have
different default intestacy rules for men and women instead? We argue that
as long as these preferences remain stable and gender correlated, a different
set of default rules for women would lead in the long run to more estate
resources being allocated to heirs according to decedents’ true preferences.
We further posit that it may be desirable to use other readily observable
characteristics (e.g., wealth, health, time of marriage, age of children, and
occupation) that could predict default rules in intestacy for population sub-
groups. As with any default rules, individuals would be free to alter these
defaults by executing a will.5
We also advocate a more ambitious version of personalization here, one
that would let courts determine how an intestate’s estate should be allocated
based on an analysis of his consumer behavior during his lifetime. In the era
of Big Data,6 we suggest that it will be possible to find individuals whose
observable behavior and characteristics closely match those of the intes-
tate—we refer to these people as “guinea pigs”—to examine the kinds of
1. Daphna Hacker, The Gendered Dimensions of Inheritance: Empirical Food for Legal
Thought, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 322, 334 (2010); Debra S. Judge & Sarah Blaffer Hardy,
Allocation of Accumulated Resources Among Close Kin: Inheritance in Sacramento, California,
1890–1984, 13 Ethology & Sociobiology 495 (1992).
2. Hacker, supra note 1, at 334.
3. Debra S. Judge, American Legacies and the Variable Life Histories of Women and Men,
6 Hum. Nature 291, 307–08 (1995).
4. We will simplify the analysis by assuming that people of a particular gender who have
wills and people of the same gender who die intestate have similar preferences—but this is an
assumption that ought to be tested empirically. See generally Hacker, supra note 1, at 329
(noting that on average intestates die at a younger age than testators); Adam J. Hirsch, Default
Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1031, 1073
(2004) (noting that intestates are poorer than testators and that this factor may engender
selection effects).
5. We take for granted the law’s assumption that ordinarily the decedent’s wishes
should be the overriding factor in determining how her estate will be divided.
6. See infra text accompanying note 68.
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choices that the guinea pigs made in their wills and then to use these choices
as a template for determining what the intestate likely would have wanted.7
An upshot of widely employing this approach is that more estates would be
allocated in a way that better approximates the true preferences of the dece-
dent. Given the fact that most individuals leave no wills, this advantage
could be significant. Furthermore, with detailed intestate defaults, many in-
dividuals who would have otherwise needed to incur the expenses of draft-
ing wills now may no longer need to do so. After all, they will recognize that
even in the absence of a written will, their intestacy rules will be personal-
ized and hence will more closely approximate what they would have wanted
than will the status quo’s one-size-fits-all approach.
We are not the first to raise the possibility of using personalized default
rules. Recently, Cass Sunstein offered a provocative assessment of existing,
impersonal default rules and suggested two alternatives to them: active
choices and personalized default rules.8 Sunstein’s work continues a conver-
sation begun by Ian Ayres, who first argued that default rules could be “tai-
lored” to market conditions or the attributes of parties.9 This conversation
was extended by George Geis, who modeled tailored and untailored default
rules under particular sets of assumptions to analyze the welfare implica-
tions of trading off precision against complexity.10
Sunstein’s bottom line is that “personalized default rules are the wave of
the future. We should expect to see a significant increase in personalization
as greater information becomes available about the informed choices of di-
verse people.”11 We agree wholeheartedly and regard his contribution to the
literature as significant. He astutely notes that the appeal of personalized
default rules depends on the heterogeneity among a given population, the
state’s access to information about individuals’ preferences and its ability to
create a structure conducive to rational choices, the richness of the data
available about individual preferences, and the transaction and confusion
costs associated with prompting parties to a transaction to make active
choices about the parameters of a deal.12 He inventively envisions personal-
ized default rules in contexts like the choice of retirement plans, cell phone
7. For much more on guinea pigs, see infra Section II.C.
8. Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2013). Under a regime of
active choice, individuals are forced to decide among various options—the contract cannot be
silent with respect to a particular term.
9. Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. Cal.
Interdisc. L.J. 1, 4 & n.15 (1993); see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs.
Minoritarian Defaults, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1591, 1593, 1596–06 (1999) (identifying several types
of contracting party heterogeneity and showing how they might affect the law’s choice among
defaults preferred by the majority of contracting parties or those preferred only by a
minority).
10. George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules, 80
Tul. L. Rev. 1109 (2006).
11. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 57.
12. Id. at 9–10.
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plans, mortgages, and other settings.13 That said, Sunstein’s discussion of
personalized default rules is truncated—it is a short part of a short essay. He
has not addressed the question of how courts would apply personalized de-
fault rules. And the earlier work by Ayres and Geis explicitly lumps together
default rules that are tailored based on both contracting parties’ characteris-
tics and market conditions, focusing—in the abstract—on the costs of
promulgating and adjudicating tailored default rules.14
No scholars have previously offered a comprehensive theory of person-
alized default rules, nor has anyone explored in detail the feasibility of such
an approach. In this Article, we will develop such a theory, show its feasibil-
ity in the real world, and point out what legislatures and courts should do in
order to make a personalized default-rule regime implementable in many
fields. In particular, we will show that with a bit of innovative tweaking,
tools developed in the age of Big Data can facilitate providing certainty
around the meaning of default terms for heterogeneous individuals and
firms. By mitigating the uncertainty associated with the development of per-
sonalized default rules, Big Data can make personalization far more appeal-
ing than it was in previous information environments.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the existing conceptions
of default rules and identifies the dominant strategies for supplying such
rules: majoritarian default rules and minoritarian (penalty) default rules. It
then shows how each type of default rule might be improved via personal-
ization, such that the content of the rule in question will differ among heter-
ogeneous individuals. In this Part, we illustrate our claims mostly through
consumer contracts and point out the main considerations that could make
the personalized default-rules approach a viable option.
Part II examines the feasibility of personalizing default rules. It observes
that crude default rules—which use one readily observable characteristic,
such as gender or age, to sort individuals into appropriate default rules—are
already feasible but are also imprecise and can be morally problematic. We
show that granular default rules, which sort individuals into several or many
different default terms based on the interactions of multiple factors, are be-
coming increasingly feasible in the era of Big Data. Part II also examines
some of the potential gains from using both crude and granular default rules
in inheritance law, consumer law, the law of medical malpractice, real prop-
erty law, and potentially even in labor law. A key innovation in Part II is our
proposed use of “guinea pigs” to personalize defaults. Under such an ap-
proach, a small portion of the population is given a great deal of informa-
tion and time to make decisions, and then the remaining members of the
population are assigned the default terms chosen by the guinea pigs whose
observed behavior and characteristics most closely match their own.
13. See, e.g., id. at 5–7, 37, 47, 56.
14. See Ayres, supra note 9 (analogizing the tailored-versus-untailored default-rule di-
lemma to the rules-versus-standards debate); Geis, supra note 10, at 1124–29 (discussing the
expected costs of having tailored default rules).
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Part III considers a number of important objections to our proposal for
personalizing default rules. These objections include concerns about unfair
cross subsidies; strategic behavior by consumers; abuse by merchants; uncer-
tainty and the fragmentation of case law interpreting contractual language;
the use of statistics and stereotypes; the constitutional implications of a legal
regime that provides different default rules to people based on immutable
characteristics; the privacy tradeoffs associated with the collection and use of
information about individuals; and the flexibility of personalized default
rules to deal with people whose personalities, values, and behaviors change
over time. In some cases, these objections have significant force and caution
against a full-throated embrace of personalized default rules. In other in-
stances, however, we show how personalized default rules can be structured
so as to mitigate potential downsides.
Part IV shows how the same arguments for personalized default rules
also buttress the case for personalized disclosure to consumers and citizens.
The present regime uses distinctly twentieth-century technologies to disclose
risks, side effects, and tradeoffs to consumers and citizens. In the modern
era, there is little reason to rely on these antiquated, impersonal forms of
disclosure. Instead, we propose a regime of “personalized disclosure”
whereby data about individual preferences, characteristics, and predilections
would be employed to improve the signal-to-noise ratio of disclosures con-
cerning products and services. Under such a regime, pregnant women would
be shown prominent warnings likely to be of greatest interest to them, and
septuagenarian men would likewise see only the warnings of greatest interest
to them. While this is how a family physician or small-town pharmacist has
historically disclosed warnings to a well-known patient, it is not the way
disclosure generally works for consumer products or medical services. Our
insight is that the powerful existing critiques of disclosure remedies are not
critiques of disclosure as such but rather of impersonal disclosure. Personal-
ized disclosure is becoming increasingly achievable in the modern era, and
we provide some initial thoughts on how it might be accomplished. Indeed,
we believe more broadly that personalized disclosures and personalized de-
fault rules—and even personalized law in general—will become essential
tools in legal regulators’ quivers in the coming decades. We even posit that
personalized disclosure can ameliorate some of the complexity problems as-
sociated with a shift toward personalized default rules. The ills of personal-
ization, it turns out, may be countered by even more personalization.
I. Theories of Personalized Default Rules
Default rules regulate much of our lives. Any transaction in which con-
sumers, merchants, employees, employers, tenants, or landlords engage will
be governed by default rules. Unsurprisingly, some commentators have sug-
gested that one of the main goals of contract law is to reduce transaction
June 2014] Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data 1423
costs by providing contracting parties with default rules that apply to their
transactions unless they explicitly or implicitly reject them.15
Default rules also regulate what happens after people die. When people
die intestate (without a will), default rules prescribed by inheritance law
allocate the estate among the heirs in a certain manner.16 An individual may
opt out of the default intestacy rules by leaving a will that allocates the estate
differently among the heirs, but as long as she does not do so, the default
rules prevail. Since many people die intestate, the content of the default rules
is of the utmost importance. Here, the default rules are particularly
“sticky”17 because biases and cognitive constraints prevent people from con-
templating their future death.18 In this situation, therefore, the transaction
costs associated with creating a will can be high.
Under the most influential default-rule theory, which we discuss in de-
tail below,19 default rules are aimed at decreasing transaction costs. In order
for default rules to achieve this goal, they should generally track most peo-
ple’s preferences and desires. If default rules do not satisfy this condition,
they would increase—rather than decrease—transaction costs since most
parties would opt out, which is costly. Furthermore, sometimes parties
would not opt out of undesirable default rules because opting out is too
costly, and therefore they would be governed by rules they would have never
chosen in the absence of transaction costs. Finally, sometimes transaction
costs prevent deals from being struck where a meeting of the minds would
have occurred but for those costs; thus, providing the parties with default
rules they prefer would reduce transaction costs and potentially facilitate
deals.
Default rules governing specific types of transactions should be tailored
until finer tailoring is not cost justified, i.e., when additional tailoring will
increase transaction costs.20 Although default rules are everywhere, their
15. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 341 (6th ed.
2012) (“Default rules fill gaps in contracts in order to reduce transaction costs.”); Steven
Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 302 & nn. 13–14 (2004) (arguing that
in order to reduce writing costs, courts should complete gaps in contracts using rules that are
most likely to be desired by the parties).
16. See, e.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 6400 (West 2009); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-437 (2013);
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 18-A, § 2-101 (2012).
17. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 Fla.
St. U. L. Rev. 651 (2006) (using the term “sticky” to define default rules in settings where the
default rule is rarely changed due to high transaction costs or for other reasons, such as fear of
unknown contract provisions).
18. Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 Wash. U.
L. Rev. 609, 636 (2009) (“But a testator’s failure to consider the risk of premature death is
entirely plausible, psychologically.”).
19. See infra Section I.B.1.
20. This is a necessary implication of the economic argument that “[t]he fewer the terms
requiring negotiation, the cheaper is the contracting process.” Cooter & Ulen, supra note 15,
at 293. But see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 117–18 (1989) (arguing that adopting tailored rules to
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prominent role in contracting is particularly well understood. The next sec-
tions focus on the personalization of contract default rules, while later in the
Article we apply our insights to other default rules as well.
A. Contract Law Default Rules
If contracting parties were required to agree on all the terms of their
contracts, negotiation would be endless, drafting costs would skyrocket, and
many efficient contracts currently executed would never result in meetings
of the mind. Contract law thus provides the parties with numerous default
rules that become part of their contracts unless the parties implicitly or ex-
plicitly reject them.21 For instance, under section 2-308 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”), “[u]nless otherwise agreed . . . the place for
delivery of goods is the seller’s place of business or if none, the seller’s resi-
dence.”22 The parties hence do not need to agree beforehand on the place of
delivery, since as long as they do not say otherwise, delivery would occur at
the seller’s place of business. And section 2-314 of the U.C.C. maintains that
“[u]nless excluded or modified . . . a warranty that the goods shall be mer-
chantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind.”23 The U.C.C. then clarifies in detail what
merchantability means.24 As a result, parties to a sale contract need not ex-
plicitly agree that the goods sold should be merchantable if the seller is a
merchant; they also do not need to define what merchantability means—the
law does it for them.
Remedies for breach of contract can be understood as another impor-
tant source of default rules. While expectation damages are the default rule,
the parties may agree otherwise, for example, by excluding or limiting liabil-
ity for consequential losses or by incorporating a liquidated damages clause
into their contracts.25 Indeed, the parties’ power to opt out of the “full
compensation” default rule is limited: courts can strike down a liquidated
fill gaps in the contract creates costs of distinguishing different types of parties and transac-
tions); Ayres, supra note 9 (arguing that when a decisionmaker creates a tailored default rule,
she should account for both precision and complexity).
21. Cooter & Ulen, supra note 15, at 293 (“When a court imputes terms to fill in a
contract, the implicit terms apply by default, which means ‘in the absence of explicit terms to
the contrary.’ ”); Shavell, supra note 15, at 302 & nn.13–14 (arguing that when parties leave
gaps in the contract, courts should fill these gaps by adopting an interpretive method that
minimizes the sum of writing costs and the costs of errors in the interpretation).
22. U.C.C. § 2-308 (2013).
23. Id. § 2-314.
24. Id. § 2-314(2) (detailing the conditions under which goods are considered
merchantable).
25. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 (1981) (stating that the parties can
decide in advance the amount of damages payable in case of breach and that such an agree-
ment replaces the court’s inquiry about the correct level of damages); E. Allan Farnsworth,
Contracts § 12.18 (4th ed. 2004) (stating that parties can agree on remedial rights different
from the remedies usually supplied by the courts).
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damages clause as a penalty26 or use the doctrine of unconscionability to
refuse to enforce exclusionary clauses in consumer contracts, especially
when such clauses exempt the merchant from liability for bodily injury.27
B. Majoritarian Default Rules
1. In General
Under the majoritarian default-rules theory, which is the most accepted
and influential theory among law-and-economics theorists, a default rule
should mimic the term that the majority of the parties to whom it applies
would have agreed on had they considered it as an option when making
their contract.28 Thus, if most contracting parties in a sales contract prefer
delivery of the goods to occur at the seller’s place, section 2-308 of the
U.C.C. is the appropriate default rule. The logic behind the majoritarian
default-rules theory is simple: since default rules aim to decrease transaction
costs, they should fit the parties’ preferences as closely as possible. There
would always be some parties that prefer a rule different from the one pre-
ferred by the majority, and these parties would then have to opt out of the
default rule and incur the attendant transaction costs. But the majority of
parties would not opt out, thereby avoiding the transaction costs they would
have incurred in the absence of the default rule.29
A central question for the majoritarian theory is how to predict most
parties’ preferences. Do most parties to sales contracts prefer delivery of the
goods at the seller’s or the buyer’s place? Do they prefer expectation dam-
ages or maybe just reliance damages? Law-and-economics scholars contend
that most contracting parties want their contracts to reduce costs and in-
crease benefits, thereby increasing the surplus of their contract, which they
can divide among themselves.30 The majoritarian default rule should there-
fore be efficient. Thus, according to this view, if in most cases the costs of
26. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 (stating that the parties’ power to set
liquidated damages is limited and that the liquidated damages provision must regard the prin-
ciple of compensation); Farnsworth, supra note 25, § 12.18 (stating that parties’ power to
bargain over remedial rights is limited by the principle of compensation, which means that the
stipulated sum cannot be significantly larger than the amount required to compensate the
injured party for its loss).
27. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (“Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in
the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable.”).
28. Cooter & Ulen, supra note 15, at 293–94 (arguing that courts should impute to the
parties the terms in the contract that the parties would have agreed on had they negotiated the
term in advance); David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1815, 1820–23 (1991) (arguing that default rules should be
the most likely result of a hypothetical bargaining between the parties).
29. Cooter & Ulen, supra note 15, at 294 (arguing that the efficient default rule is
preferable because most parties would not wish to opt out, which would save transaction
costs).
30. Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer, Remedies On and Off Contract, 120
Yale L.J. 690 (2011) (arguing that the remedy of rescission followed by restitution is socially
desirable and that the parties to the contract would want it ex ante, since it incentivizes them
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delivery at the seller’s place of business are lower than at the buyer’s, section
2-308 of the U.C.C. is an efficient default rule. Similarly, if full expectation
damages provide more efficient incentives to the parties to perform the con-
tract and reduce expected losses compared to reliance damages, an expecta-
tion damages default rule is superior to a reliance damages default rule.31
Note that one need not be efficiency oriented to adopt the majoritarian de-
fault-rule theory; this theory is committed to one notion only—the default
rule should mimic the majority of the parties’ preferences, whatever these
preferences are.32
Default rules can be context sensitive, which is a nod in the direction of
personalization.33 Thus, even if a damages default rule is better than a spe-
cific performance default rule in total—since most contracting parties would
prefer the former remedy to the latter—this might not be true in specific
situations or with certain types of contracts. While the more common rem-
edy under American contract law is damages,34 when the contract is for the
sale of a unique good, courts are often willing to grant a remedy of specific
performance.35 Instead of having one default rule on the choice between
damages and specific performance for all contracts, there are two different
default rules: one for selling unique goods and another for other contracts.
But the default rules could be—and indeed they are—even more specifically
to invest in the contract to the level that maximizes the joint surplus); Richard A. Posner, The
Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1581, 1588 (2005) (“Each party
[to the contract] wants to maximize his gain from the transaction, and that is usually best
done by agreeing to terms that maximize the surplus created by the transaction—the excess of
benefits over costs, the excess being divided between the parties.”).
31. See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 15, at 287–89 (arguing that expectation damages
usually give better incentives to the promisor and therefore are superior to reliance damages);
Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 Bell J. Econ. 466 (1980) (arguing
that full expectation damages provide efficient incentive to parties to perform and thus fill
gaps in the contract that involve unlikely future contingencies); Steven Shavell, Why Breach of
Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1569,
1573–74 (2009) (arguing that the promisor’s option to breach and pay expectation damages is
a default rule incorporated into an incomplete contract).
32. See Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 Colum. L.
Rev. 396 (2009) (arguing that some default rules have a distributive, rather than an efficiency,
effect, and proposing criteria for giving these default rules content); Richard Craswell, Contract
Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489 (1989) (explaining
how nonefficiency theories of contract law could be the source of default rules but arguing
that efficiency is the much better source).
33. See Ayres, supra note 9 (arguing that when a decisionmaker creates a tailored default
rule, she should find the optimal point at which the rule is specific enough but not too com-
plex); Geis, supra note 10 (modeling the simplicity–complexity dimension of default rules and
suggesting that under certain assumptions a simpler, although less accurate, default rule would
better reduce transaction costs).
34. Farnsworth, supra note 25, § 12.8 (stating that the award of damages, measured by
the injured party’s expectation, is the common form of relief for breach of contract).
35. Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 351, 355–56 (1978)
(stating that courts typically grant specific performance in contracts for the sale of a “unique”
item, such as the sale of land, antiques, and patent rights); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific
Performance, 89 Yale L.J. 271, 272–74 (1979) (same).
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tailored. And at least from an economics perspective, they should be tailored
until the point where additional tailoring is no longer cost justified.36 A re-
lated issue also arises with personalized default rules.37
2. Personalized Majoritarian Default Rules
Default rules are often tailored for different types of transactions or
contexts. But as far as we can tell, they are usually not tailored to the per-
sonal characteristics of the parties.38 Consider the following example:
Example 1. Place of delivery. Dan is a disabled consumer who uses a wheel-
chair for mobility. He purchases a large-screen television from an electron-
ics store. Should the default place of delivery be the seller’s or the buyer’s
place?
Even if for most consumer contracts the efficient rule is delivery at the
seller’s place, this is not necessarily the case in Example 1. The personally
tailored default rule for consumers who use wheelchairs, and who can be
easily identified as using a wheelchair, would typically be delivery at the
buyer’s place, since such delivery would reduce the parties’ total costs and
would therefore be their preferred option.39 Indeed, with such a default rule,
a seller would probably be able to charge the disabled buyer a premium for
delivery. And needless to say, either party should be able to opt out of the
personalized default rule if he wishes. But as long as neither does so, delivery
at the buyer’s place in Example 1 could be a better default rule than the rule
commonly applied to buyers who are not disabled.40 Now consider a more
complicated example:
36. Ayres, supra note 9, at 7–9 (arguing that since more tailoring creates complexity and
uncertainty, the decisionmaker needs to tailor the rule up to the point where these costs out-
weigh the reduction in transaction costs).
37. Personalized default rules raise the issue of what level of additional tailoring is no
longer cost justified given the possible tradeoff between accuracy and certainty. See infra Sec-
tion III.D.
38. In the U.C.C., there is a distinction between merchants and nonmerchants (U.C.C.
§ 2-104(1) (2013) defines a merchant), and some of the Code’s terms offer customized rules
for merchants. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314 (imposing higher warranty standards by default on
merchant sales). Some commentators have advocated for different rules of interpretation for
sophisticated and nonsophisticated parties. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 569–70 (2003) (arguing that sophis-
ticated parties prefer textualist interpretation of contracts).
39. See Shields v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts US, 279 F.R.D. 529 (C.D. Cal. 2011). In a
motion for class certification, plaintiffs, all visually impaired visitors of the Disney resorts in
California, alleged that defendants discriminated against them. Id. at 540. One of the argu-
ments was that the defendant’s audio description devices were designed to shut off automati-
cally after a given time and could not be reset by visually impaired users. Id. The court
analyzed this argument in terms of the device’s potential design defects. Id. at 550. One could
argue that most users preferred the automatic shutdown, thus making it the majoritarian de-
fault rule, while the plaintiffs were seeking to impose on the defendant a personalized default
rule for visually impaired visitors.
40. Business practices in American grocery stores track this default rule to some extent.
A grocery bagger is likely to ask an elderly customer with a large order whether she would like
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Example 2. Specific performance or damages. Steven is a classic rational ac-
tor. He feels no personal attachment to property and changes his residence
quite often. Sarah holds Kantian moral values regarding keeping one’s
promises, feels personal attachment to property, rarely changes her place of
residence and, when she does, she spends months searching for the perfect
place. Both Steven and Sarah entered into (separate) contracts to purchase
homes from John, who is a merchant in the business of selling homes. John
breaches both contracts by failing to deliver possession and title, and the
question of the adequate remedy arises. Assuming everything else about
the contracts is equal, except the parties’ characteristics, should the court
order the same remedy for Steven and Sarah?
Under current law, the answer is typically yes. A possible qualification is that
if John could have reasonably understood while negotiating the contracts
with Steven and Sarah that Steven preferred a damages remedy and Sarah
preferred specific performance, the court may take John’s understanding
into account in choosing the appropriate remedy. We argue that under the
assumption that John and the courts can verify the parties’ characteristics, a
court ought to award damages to Steven and grant specific performance to
Sarah. Indeed, John may price the contract differently for Steven and Sarah,
or at least offer them different contractual terms, which would balance the
additional costs that specific performance entails for the seller.
C. Minoritarian (or Penalty) Default Rules
1. In General
In a seminal article published in 1989, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner
identified a second type of default rule, which they called the “Penalty De-
fault Rule.”41 Unlike the majoritarian default rule, the penalty default rule is
not aimed at mimicking the contractual term most parties prefer but instead
at penalizing the party who has private information that the other party
does not have. Such a penalty is designed to incentivize the party with pri-
vate information to reveal this information to the party without it, thereby
facilitating an efficient contract.42
An example penalty default rule used by Ayres and Gertner was the
foreseeability requirement of Hadley v. Baxendale.43 Under this requirement,
assistance unloading groceries into her car, but he would probably not bother asking the same
question to a twenty-year-old who has purchased a box of corn flakes and a magazine.
41. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 20, at 91 (“Penalty defaults [are defaults that] are de-
signed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule
and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer.”).
42. On other occasions, a penalty default rule would penalize both parties for concealing
information that makes the determination of their dispute easier for courts; in this way, Ayres
and Gertner explain the then–U.C.C. § 2-201 zero-quantity provision, under which, if the
parties have not agreed on the quantity, the courts would not fill in this gap and would not
enforce the contract. Id. at 95–100 & n.43.
43. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 Ex. 341.
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the aggrieved party is only entitled to compensation for foreseeable losses.
Ayres and Gertner explain that without the foreseeability limitation on lia-
bility, an aggrieved party with unforeseeable losses would hide this informa-
tion from the other party.44 The foreseeability limitation penalizes an
aggrieved party who hides the information by barring recovery for his un-
foreseeable losses in case of a breach.45 In particular, if the aggrieved party is
not the cheapest cost avoider or the cheapest insurer of his unforeseeable
losses, he would disclose the potential losses to the other party. This disclo-
sure renders the losses foreseeable, and the other party would take them into
account in deciding whether to enter into the contract, how much to invest
in precautions, and whether to perform or breach.46
Commentators criticize Ayres and Gertner’s penalty default-rules theory
from several angles. They argue that a penalty default rule would not neces-
sarily force a contracting party to reveal private information because such a
move might directly contradict its bargaining strategy47 or because the party
might benefit from being pooled together with other parties, which could
allow it to externalize costs to them.48 Eric Posner prominently argues that
there are no penalty default rules in contract law, nor should there be any.49
This is because both majoritarian default rules and penalty default rules
force contracting parties with private information, who prefer to opt out of
the default rule, to reveal their private information to the other party, who
would offer them a different contract in exchange.50 Opting out is costly, so
a majoritarian default rule would function better than a penalty default rule,
since it encourages fewer parties to opt out. It is possible that the minority’s
total costs of opting out would exceed the majority’s total costs of doing so,
but this is an unlikely scenario.51
44. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 20, at 101–04.
45. Id. (arguing that the decision in Hadley is an example of a penalty default rule).
46. See Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient
Breach, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 629 (1988) (describing the various stages where the promisor makes
decisions affecting the likelihood of breach); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Per-
formance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 341 (1984)
(describing different remedies for breach of contract and examining when parties may take
them into account).
47. Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract De-
fault Rules, 100 Yale L.J. 615, 617 (1990) (arguing that the Hadley default penalty rule will not
incentivize promisees to reveal private information since revealing the value the promisee as-
cribes to the contract with the promisor would allow the promisor to raise the contract price
substantially).
48. Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 Stan. L. Rev.
1547, 1551 (1999) (arguing that parties with private information would not reveal their types
when they benefit from the cross subsidization entailed by pooling them with other parties).
49. Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 563, 586–87 (2006).
50. Id. at 569–73.
51. Id. at 573 (arguing that examples of penalty default rules are either not default rules
at all or can be explained by the majoritarian default-rule theory); see also Lucian Ayre
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We might better understand a penalty default rule as a species of mi-
noritarian default rule, as Ayres and Gertner in fact acknowledge in an essay
they published a decade after they first proposed the penalty default-rule
idea.52 We believe that at least as personalized default rules are concerned,
there could be minoritarian default rules, as we explain more fully below.
But we also suspect that the rise of Big Data (described in Part II) will make
penalty default rules less important, since firms are gaining access to a trea-
sure trove of information about individual consumers.
2. Minoritarian Default Rules as Facilitators of Personalized
Default Rules
Minoritarian default rules could facilitate personalized majoritarian de-
fault rules. If sellers and courts have full information about buyers, default
rules aimed at forcing buyers to reveal private information will be meaning-
less. Sellers and courts, however, often do not have full information about
buyers’ preferences, characteristics, and traits, and personally tailoring de-
fault rules for them seems impractical. A default rule would encourage buy-
ers to reveal their preferences, characteristics, and traits to sellers, either for a
specific transaction or for many future transactions, by penalizing those
buyers who could cheaply convey such information yet fail to do so.
Consider again Example 2 (Specific performance or damages). Suppose
sellers and courts cannot distinguish accurately between Steven and Sarah,
and therefore it is impossible to tailor personalized default rules. Neverthe-
less, a default rule of damages could still change the outcome. If Sarah is
aware of the damages default rule, she will reveal her preferences for specific
performance to the seller or, alternatively, reveal her characteristics and
traits to him, from which he would be able to deduce that unless they agree
otherwise, her remedy will be specific performance. Thus, the damages de-
fault rule will penalize Sarah if she does not convey information to the seller
about her preferences or characteristics.
Could specific performance function in the same way? Under a specific
performance default rule, Steven would arguably reveal neither his prefer-
ence for damages nor his characteristics and traits because he is no worse off
with specific performance than with a damages remedy. Although he is in-
different about the remedy, he may be better off with specific performance,
Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Infor-
mation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1615, 1619–26 (1999) (assessing the Hadley default rule of limited
liability and arguing that the rule entails some costs in different situations and should be
adopted only where the parties would have most likely wanted it in advance, which makes it a
majoritarian default rule); Johnston, supra note 47, at 622–23 (arguing that the Hadley rule
might be preferable to the parties ex ante and thus not a penalty rule).
52. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 9, at 1600–02, 1606 (explaining that the penalty default
rule is one type of minoritarian default rule, which is efficient when it is less costly for the
majority to opt out than it is for the minority to do so).
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since it would improve his bargaining position vis-a`-vis the seller’s, for
whom specific performance is typically more burdensome.53
But this analysis is incomplete. If the seller is able to structure the con-
tract to reward buyers who are entitled to the less burdensome remedy, then
both damages and specific performance could function effectively to force
buyers to reveal their preferences, characteristics, and traits. Specifically,
while a damages default rule would penalize Sarah ex post if she does not
reveal her preferences or characteristics, specific performance would penal-
ize Steven ex ante (higher price or less favorable contractual terms) if he
does not reveal his preferences or characteristics. The choice between dam-
ages and specific performance should therefore hinge on the empirical ques-
tion of who bears the lower costs in revealing their preferences or
characteristics: Steven or Sarah? If the answer is Steven, specific performance
should be the more efficient default rule, and if it is Sarah, damages should
be the most efficient default rule. If there are more “Stevens” than “Sarahs”
among buyers but it is much less costly for the “Stevens” than for the
“Sarahs” to reveal their preferences or characteristics, specific performance
could be the efficient (minoritarian) default.
Under our personalized default-rules theory, parties do not directly ne-
gotiate the terms of the contract but instead reveal information about their
characteristics and traits, which in turn affects the contents of the default
rules applied to them. This information could often be private and even
confidential: not every sensitive, neurotic buyer would like to reveal these
attributes to a seller. In other words, for some types of characteristics and
traits, the default rules could be stickier than for others, and the people
possessing the former characteristics and traits could be the minority. In the
same way, some types of parties may have significant cognitive limitations or
biases that would make it especially burdensome to reveal private informa-
tion about their preferences, and these parties could be the minority. In such
a situation, a minoritarian default rule could similarly work better than a
majoritarian one.
D. Third-Party Effects
The third approach to determining the content of default rules requires
that the rules maximize social welfare generally, not just the welfare of the
contracting parties. Contract law often takes negative effects on third parties
as a central consideration in enforcing contracts. For example, an entire
chapter of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is dedicated to “Unenforce-
ability on Grounds of Public Policy.”54 This chapter, however, is not about
default rules but instead about mandatory, immutable rules: naturally, the
53. See Craswell, supra note 46, at 636–38 (noting that specific performance, like over-
compensatory remedies, has the potential to discourage efficient breaches); Schwartz, supra
note 35, at 274 (arguing that if damages are fully compensatory, adding the option of specific
performance creates an opportunity for the promisee to exploit the promisor by threatening to
compel performance when costs of performance are higher than the damages).
54. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178–199 (1981).
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parties are not allowed to opt out of these rules. Contract law doctrines,
however, only rarely take into account positive effects on third parties,55 and
externalizing benefit default rules are rare.56
In some instances, the personalization of default rules may produce
benefits to third parties, or positive externalities, and the desire to promote
such externalities may convince society to embrace personalization. For ex-
ample, many jurisdictions confront the dilemma of how to encourage peo-
ple to donate their organs after death to save other people’s lives. A possible
solution is to have a default rule that is expected to be quite sticky: most
people would not opt out, whatever the default rule is.57 Assuming the social
goal is to find an optimum between fulfilling people’s wishes and benefiting
third parties (if these benefits were the only issue, a mandatory rule of dona-
tion would be the optimal solution58), tailoring personalized default rules to
different groups in society could be an optimal solution. Thus, if there are
groups in society—say, adherents of Shintoism—who are expected to object
to organ donations and would opt out of any default rule that allows them,59
a no-donation default rule is the desirable one for them, since it would save
the transaction costs of opting out. But if there are other groups in society
that might weakly oppose donation but would not be willing to incur the
costs of opting out, applying a default rule that is not majoritarian but bal-
ances possible donors’ weak preferences against the possible recipients’
strong preferences could better achieve the social goal. Indeed, rules could
be personalized to benefit the interest groups that in the absence of per-
sonalization would most forcefully oppose a rule that benefits third parties.
This personalization would dampen political opposition.
The discussion above highlights the applicability of our proposal for
personalized default rules to any concept of default rules that attributes at
least some significance to the preferences of the individuals making the
choices. Take our inheritance example60: suppose that under a given legal
system the decedent’s preferences are not the only criterion in allocating
assets, but other social goals are also considered important. As long as indi-
viduals are free to make wills, their preferences are legally significant. The
law could then tailor personalized default rules that take into account peo-
ple’s preferences, which vary among individuals, together with social goals,
which are common to everyone. Thus, individuals with strong preferences
55. See, e.g., id. § 207 (“In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise . . . a
meaning that serves the public interest is generally preferred.”). But see Eyal Zamir, The In-
verted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1710,
1723–24 (1997) (“Despite [section 207’s] broad formulation, it is assumed that this rule only
applies to contracts ‘which affect a public interest.’ ”).
56. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 9, at 1598–99 (discussing default rules that create
positive externalities).
57. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 12–13.
58. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 Yale L.J. 781, 807–08 (2005).
59. See Robert Steinbuch, Kidneys, Cash, and Kashrut: A Legal, Economic, and Religious
Analysis of Selling Kidneys, 45 Hous. L. Rev. 1529, 1566 n.268 (2009).
60. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
June 2014] Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data 1433
would often make wills, and their preferences would govern the allocation of
their estates. By contrast, individuals whose preferences are weaker would
not make wills, and their estates would be allocated according to personal-
ized default rules that are tailored to those people’s preferences, together
with the social goals that the law considers important.
II. The Feasibility of Personalized Default Rules
Part I showed how default rules might be personalized. The discussion
so far implicitly has contemplated two different sorts of personalized default
rules: crude and granular default rules.
One crude personalized default rule takes a particular, observable char-
acteristic and sorts individuals into different legal defaults based on whether
they possess that characteristic. For example, if the state observes that men
and women have systematically different preferences for how their estates
should be divvied up among heirs, then the law might create one set of
intestacy rules for men and another for women.61 Gender is easily observa-
ble, so the costs of determining which set of intestacy rules applies will be
low. Indeed, inheritance law already employs gender-sensitive mandatory
rules, as in the case of a few state dower statutes that are designed to protect
the economic interests of widows, whom legislatures perceive to be more
economically vulnerable than widowers following the death of a spouse.62
The preference-insensitive nature of these rules and their potential to rein-
force stereotypes help make their persistence controversial.
When a characteristic like age or gender becomes the basis for a waiv-
able default rule, concerns about limiting testamentary freedom disappear
and antistereotyping considerations may be ameliorated. Thus, personalized
default rules are already employed in some contexts. For example, some em-
ployers have implemented automatic enrollment for 401(k) retirement ac-
counts, with a contribution level that is personalized based on the worker’s
age.63 Furthermore, there are proposals to provide workers with investment
vehicles that are tailored to the number of years they expect to continue
working.64 Similarly, new cars can sense the weight of a passenger in the
front seat and disable the air bag to reduce the risk of injury to a lighter
61. Assume for present purposes that such classifications are legally permissible, al-
though this assumption may be unreasonable. We discuss the issue further infra in Sections
III.F–G.
62. See, e.g., In re Estate of Miltenberger, 737 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (re-
jecting equal protection challenges to Michigan’s statute providing that widows—but not wid-
owers—are entitled to at least one-third of a deceased spouse’s land holdings). But cf. Stokes v.
Stokes, 613 S.W.2d 372, 376 (Ark. 1981) (invalidating a gender-sensitive dower statute on
equal protection grounds). See generally Joslyn R. Muller, Comment, Haven’t Women Obtained
Equality? An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Dower in Michigan, 87 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev.
533 (2010) (surveying gender-sensitive dower statutes in various states).
63. We thank Lauren Willis for this example.
64. See Gordon T. Butler, American Paternalism and the One Fund Solution, 9 Wyo. L.
Rev. 485, 521 (2009).
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passenger if the air bag is deployed in a crash.65 We can refer to approaches
that use a single variable like gender, age, or weight as the sole basis for
tailoring as “crude personalized default rules.”
Greater personalization is possible. Suppose that politically conservative
and politically liberal women have different preferences with respect to the
division of their estates. Suppose further that politically conservative women
from cities and rural areas systematically differ in the way they prefer to
divide their estates. In theory, there are a multitude of possible personalized
default rules. Nevertheless, regularities exist, and the task of using these reg-
ularities to establish sufficiently large groups of like-minded individuals who
can be assigned the same set of default rules implicates a tradeoff between
precision and complexity.66 We will refer to precise default rules that employ
many characteristics about individuals—including their past behaviors in
similar circumstances—to predict the contractual or testamentary terms
they would have opted for as “granular personalized default rules.”
The feasibility of employing crude personalized default rules is a
straightforward matter. We need only show that a particular characteristic
accurately predicts future behavior. That said, we will show why using crude
personalized default rules is often less desirable than employing granular
personalized default rules. In this Part, we therefore will focus on the feasi-
bility of the granular defaults.
A. Big Data and Big Five
An apparent hurdle in creating personalized default rules is the issue of
conveniently identifying relevant default rules both ex ante by the parties
and ex post by the courts. Suppose a legal dispute has arisen concerning
ambiguity in a contract. Once the nature and the stakes of the dispute are
clear to both parties, each will have an incentive to argue that she is the type
of person who ought to be entitled to the personalized default rule that
would cause the court to rule in her favor. In Example 2, both Steven and
Sarah will argue that they are the types of people entitled to specific per-
formance if this remedy creates an entitlement that strengthens their bar-
gaining position relative to John’s.67 Is there a reliable way to prevent these
problems of proof? We believe that in the era of Big Data, the answer to this
question is yes.
Big Data is commonly defined as the process whereby computers sift
through enormous quantities of data to identify patterns that can predict
65. N. Craig Smith et al., Smart Defaults: From Hidden Persuaders to Adaptive Helpers 18
(INSEAD Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2009/03/ISIC, 2009) available at https://
flora.insead.edu/fichiersti_wp/inseadwp2009/2009-03.pdf. This proposal for “smart defaults”
is similar to the “personalized defaults” approaches discussed in the legal literature, although
the authors’ discussion of smart defaults is quite abbreviated.
66. See infra Section III.D.
67. See supra Section I.B.2 and text accompanying note 53.
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individuals’ future behavior.68 It depends on the combination of gigantic
databases (typically cataloging consumer behavior) with predictive analytics.
Firms spent $28 billion on Big Data in 2012, a number that was estimated to
have grown to $34 billion in 2013.69 To put this $28 billion number in per-
spective, it is an amount equal to the annual Gross Domestic Product of
Jordan or Latvia70 yet with greater growth potential.
What did all that money purchase? It is hard to know for sure since
many uses of Big Data are being kept as proprietary trade secrets. But in the
past year or two, the news media has reported on a dizzying array of indus-
tries applying the tools of Big Data. Facebook’s new “graph search” feature
seeks to employ the company’s Big Database to better predict which search
results will be most useful to individuals who type in search queries.71 Big
Data is a big industry in higher education.72 Big Data is a big business in
medicine.73 It is all the rage in insurance.74 Researchers have shown how they
can predict an individual’s race by analyzing online behavior75 and can make
accurate predictions about an individual’s ideology by monitoring her tele-
vision viewing habits.76 And the campaign to reelect President Obama was
lauded (and criticized) for its sophisticated use of Big Data techniques to
identify and energize the president’s partisans.77 These technologies have
68. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 Harv. L. Rev.
2010, 2021 (2013).
69. Nick Kolakowski, Big Data Spending Will Hit $28 Billion in 2012: Gartner, Slashdot
(Oct. 17, 2012), http://slashdot.org/topic/bi/big-data-spending-will-hit-28-billion-in-2012-
gartner/.
70. GDP—Countries—List, Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/
country-list/gdp (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).
71. See Somini Sengupta & Claire Cain Miller, Search Option from Facebook Is Privacy
Test, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/19/tech-
nology/with-graph-search-facebook-bets-on-more-sharing.html.
72. See Marc Perry, Please Be eAdvised, N.Y. Times, July 22, 2012, at ED24, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/education/edlife/colleges-awakening-to-the-opportuni-
ties-of-data-mining.html.
73. See, e.g., Derrick Harris, Better Medicine, Brought to You by Big Data, GigaOM (July
15, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://gigaom.com/cloud/better-medicine-brought-to-you-by-big-data/
?utm_source=Social&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=gigaom.
74. See Laurie Sullivan, Credit Ratings Aid Marketers in Targeting Ads, Media Post News
(Aug. 17, 2012, 4:29 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/181075/credit-rat-
ings-aid-marketers-in-targeting-ads.html#axzz2F2rHWmiH.
75. Alistair Croll, Big Data Is Our Generation’s Civil Rights Issue, and We Don’t Know It,
O’Reilly Radar (Aug. 2, 2012), http://radar.oreilly.com/2012/08/big-data-is-our-generations-
civil-rights-issue-and-we-dont-know-it.html.
76. Bill Carter, Republicans Like Golf, Democrats Prefer Cartoons, TV Research Suggests,
N.Y. Times Media Decoder (Oct. 11, 2012, 7:42 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.
com/2012/10/11/republicans-like-golf-democrats-prefer-cartoons-tv-research-suggests/?smid=
tw-nytimes.
77. See Christi Parsons & Kathleen Hennessey, Obama’s Math Geeks Raised the Odds,
L.A. Times, Nov. 14, 2012, at A8, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/13/nation/
la-na-obama-analytics-20121113.
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been employed to help businesses find customers who are profitable, pa-
tients who need special care, voters who are persuadable, and insureds who
present good risks.78
Even brick-and-mortar outfits with familiar business models are using
data-driven strategies to personalize service in a way that will appeal to their
customers. For example, restaurants are increasingly assembling dossiers on
customers to enable them to remember whether particular patrons prefer
black or white napkins and red or white wine.79 This information can then
be shared with partner restaurants via Opentable.com’s reservation
database.80 With the benefit of this data, savvy restaurants can provide a
first-time diner with the same sort of personalized service that regulars from
the neighborhood have long come to expect.
Law is perhaps the primary major industry in which the effects of Big
Data have not been widely documented, although that is beginning to
change, according to a recent article by Daniel Katz.81 Katz identifies many
applications of Big Data to the legal profession, suggesting its utility in pre-
dicting legal costs at the outset of a case, predicting outcomes in litigation,
helping firms hire the right attorneys, and managing the discovery process.82
Our proposal suggests a different way in which the legal system can leverage
the benefits of Big Data. Under certain circumstances, we want the courts
(and advocates in the courtroom) to embrace the science of Big Data as a
means of deciding what terms ought to be imported into an ambiguous
contract or will. Furthermore, we propose that parties often would be able
to use Big Data to predict beforehand what default rules will be applied to
their contracts. We later explain in more detail how that would work, but
before we do so, a few more words on Big Data and the “Big Five” personal-
ity characteristics are in order.
Journalists writing about Big Data have spilled much more ink discuss-
ing its proliferation than what makes it effective. At bottom, we believe a
major reason why Big Data enables firms and government entities to predict
future behavior is that patterns of purchases, mouse clicks, credit payments,
and social network ties reveal fundamental aspects of individuals’ personali-
ties and values.83
78. See, e.g., Natasha Singer, Shoppers, Meet Your Scorekeeper, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 2012,
at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/business/electronic-scores-rank-con-
sumers-by-potential-value.html (profiling eBureau, a technology company that uses data min-
ing to determine which individuals are likely to be profitable customers for firms).
79. Susanne Craig, Getting to Know You, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 2012, at D1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/05/dining/what-restaurants-know-about-you.html?page-
wanted=all&_r=0.
80. Id.
81. Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—or—How I Learned to Stop Wor-
rying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 Emory
L.J. 909 (2013).
82. Id.
83. Strahilevitz, supra note 68, at 2022–24.
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Psychologists understand human behavior largely in terms of the Big
Five personality characteristics: extraversion, euroticism, agreeableness, con-
scientiousness, and openness.84 An enormous psychological literature has
identified ways in which particular personality traits are more pronounced
among people who engage in particular sorts of behaviors.85 For example,
people who score highly on extraversion are more likely to disclose informa-
tion about themselves on social networks,86 and people who score highly on
conscientiousness are more likely to be politically conservative.87 Other re-
search suggests that American college students score noticeably higher on
personality tests measuring agreeableness than do their Western European
counterparts.88 The Big Five is not the only valid framework for assessing
personality. Various psychologists have categorized different dimensions of
personality, such as authoritarian personality traits,89 which we will address
in turn.90
By employing Big Data, firms have found a substitute for administering
complex personality tests to each potential customer to identify her quirks
and predilections.91 Because these firms are using publicly available data and
proprietary data that is bought and sold in the marketplace, they can dis-
pense with obtaining the consent of the individuals whose behavior they are
studying. Moreover, because they will be studying a consumer’s revealed
preferences rather than her responses to surveys (which might be slanted in
84. Murray R. Barrick & Michael K. Mount, The Big Five Personality Dimensions and Job
Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 44 Personnel Psychol. 1, 1–5 (1991).
85. The legal literature employing the Big Five analysis in a sophisticated way, by con-
trast, is relatively sparse. For examples of successful interdisciplinary work of this sort, see
Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, When Is It Wrong to Trade Stocks on the Basis of Non-
Public Information? Public Views of the Morality of Insider Trading, 39 Fordham Urb. L.J. 445
(2011), and Margaret C. Stevenson & Tracy L. Caldwell, Personality in Juror Decision-Making:
Toward an Idiographic Approach in Research, 33 Law & Psychol. Rev. 93 (2009). Although it
characterizes individuals in a way that diverges somewhat from the Big Five framework, the
Cultural Cognition Project has done the most influential legal work applying research about
personality heterogeneity to legal problems. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition
and Public Policy: The Case of Outpatient Commitment Laws, 34 Law & Hum. Behav. 118
(2010).
86. Baiyun Chen & Justin Marcus, Students’ Self-Presentation on Facebook: An Examina-
tion of Personality and Self-Construal Factors, 28 Computers in Hum. Behav. 2091, 2097
(2012); Tracii Ryan & Sophia Xenos, Who Uses Facebook? An Investigation into the Relationship
Between the Big Five, Shyness, Narcissism, Loneliness, and Facebook Usage, 27 Computers in
Hum. Behav. 1658, 1662 (2011).
87. Dana R. Carney et al., The Secret Lives of Liberals and Conservatives: Personality
Profiles, Interaction Styles, and the Things They Leave Behind, 29 Pol. Psychol. 807, 824
(2008).
88. David P. Schmitt et al., The Geographic Distribution of Big Five Personality Traits, 38 J.
Cross-Cultural Psychol. 173, 185 tbl.2 (2007).
89. See, e.g., John Duckitt, Authoritarianism and Group Identification: A New View of an
Old Construct, 10 Pol. Psychol. 63 (1989).
90. See infra Section II.B.2.
91. Strahilevitz, supra note 68, at 2023.
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ways the consumer believes will benefit her), firms may justifiably view the
results of these quasipersonality tests as particularly reliable metrics.
To be sure, we are not suggesting that the Big Five research unlocks
every behavioral mystery—the extant data suggest otherwise.92 Rather, our
more modest claim is that personality profiling identifies many powerful
tendencies among individuals and groups. Personality’s causal role in deter-
mining human behavior might also help alleviate some of the “black-box”
concerns about Big Data’s use. Without some theory of why a consumer’s
decision to purchase a particular product at Time 1 helps explain that same
consumer’s creditworthiness at Time 2, there is a greater risk that the corre-
lation between Time 1 and Time 2 behaviors is spurious and will not be
useful in prediction.93 Worse yet, an unexplained, black-box correlation
might be driven by considerations that the legal system has chosen to render
illegitimate.94
A fascinating article by Gokul Chittaranjan, Jan Blom, and Daniel Gat-
ica-Perez shows the promise and potential of using data mining to identify
individuals’ personality profiles.95 These three scholars administered person-
ality tests to scores of Swiss smartphone users and then monitored the users’
smartphone activity over the next seventeen months. They found many sig-
nificant correlations between particular personality traits and observed
smartphone behavior. If you have a person’s cell-phone data and you know
what to look for, you know a lot about what makes her tick. Along the way,
the tests showed that as a practical matter, it is easy to analyze automatically
smartphone usage data to predict the personalities of individual phone
users. The scholars summarized some of their main findings as follows:
The results clearly show that several aggregated smart-phone usage features
could be predictive of the Big-Five personality traits . . . . It was found that
extraverts, who are characterized by talkativeness and outgoing nature,
were more likely to receive calls and also spend more time on them . . . .
Agreeableness among females was associated with an increase in the num-
ber of incoming calls. Agreeable males were found to communicate with
more number of unique contacts through voice calls. On the other hand,
conscientiousness was associated with higher usage of the Mail app, that
could be used in a professional context, and with lower usage of the You-
tube application, which is likely to be used for entertainment purposes.
Conscientious users were also likely to contact lesser number of unique
people through voice calls. This conforms with their characterization in the
literature as responsible and organized individuals. Interestingly, emotional
92. See, e.g., Stevenson & Caldwell, supra note 85, at 110–11.
93. Cf. Anya Bernstein, The Hidden Costs of Terrorist Watch Lists, 61 Buff. L. Rev. 461,
473–74 (2013) (discussing related problems in the context of governmental use of Big Data to
predict national security threats).
94. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Judged by the Tin Man: Individual Rights in the
Age of Big Data, 11 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 351, 366 (2013).
95. Gokul Chittaranjan et al., Mining Large-Scale Smartphone Data for Personality Stud-
ies, 17 Pers. & Ubiquitous Computing 433 (2013).
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stability was linked to higher incoming SMS. And high openness was asso-
ciated with increased usage of Video/Audio/Music apps in females and also
with the usage of nonstandard calling profiles such as Beep and Ascending
in the entire population.96
This is an extraordinarily rich set of findings, and it suggests that Verizon,
AT&T, Apple, Samsung, and other major firms in the cell-phone industry
possess a treasure chest of personal information about their customers. Yet
legal scholars have ignored their research. A follow-up Big Data project, in
which a team of researchers from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and the University of Trento analyzed social network ties and personalities of
cell-phone users, suggests that in many respects behavioral data from
smartphones can better predict individuals’ personalities than personality
surveys themselves.97 This research confirms that behavioral data can predict
personality, and we already know from the psychology literature that per-
sonality can predict behavior. The iPhones, not the eyes, turn out to be the
windows into the soul. Is it any wonder that Google has gotten into the
business of making its own cell phone?98
Smartphones are not the only Big Data tool that researchers can use to
unlock individuals’ personality scores. In the last few years, there has been
an explosion of research using the same tools to discern Big Five personality
traits from social media usage data.99 Researchers at Microsoft and Cam-
bridge University produced a thorough working paper in which they de-
velop a model that can predict 33% of the variation in extraversion, 26% of
the variation in neuroticism, and 17% of the variation in conscientiousness
through automated analysis of individuals’ Facebook activity.100 Evidently,
what is true of smartphones is true of social networking platforms. And as
96. Id. at 449.
97. Jacopo Staiano et al., Friends Don’t Lie: Inferring Personality Traits from Social Net-
work Structure, U. Trento Department Info. Engineering & Computer Sci. (Sept. 2012),
http://disi.unitn.it/~staiano/pubs/SLAPSP_UBICOMP12.pdf (“[W]e believe that our results
have provided compelling evidence that mobile phones-based behavioral data can be superior
to survey ones for the purposes of personality classification.”).
98. David Pogue, Look Ma! A No-Hands Smartphone!, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 2013, at B1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/07/technology/personaltech/the-moto-x-from-
google-iphones-latest-challenger.html?pagewanted=all.
99. See, e.g., David John Hughes et al., A Tale of Two Sites: Twitter vs. Facebook and the
Personality Predictors of Social Media Usage, 28 Computers in Hum. Behav. 561 (2012); Lin
Qiu et al., You Are What You Tweet: Personality Expression and Perception on Twitter, 46 J. Res.
Personality 710 (2012); J. William Stoughton et al., Big Five Personality Traits Reflected in Job
Applicants’ Social Media Postings, 16 Cyberpsychology, Behav. & Soc. Networking 800
(2013); Golnoosh Farnadi et al., Recognizing Personality Traits Using Facebook Status Updates,
Proc. Seventh Int’l AAAI Conf. on Weblogs & Soc. Media 14 (2013); Daniele Quercia et
al., Facebook and Privacy: The Balancing Act of Personality, Gender, and Relationship Currency,
Proc. Sixth Int’l AAAI Conf. on Weblogs & Soc. Media 306 (2012).
100. Yoram Bachrach et al., Personality and Patterns of Facebook Usage, Proc. 3rd Ann.
ACM Web Sci. Conf. 24 (2012).
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the world moves toward an Internet of Things,101 it is conceivable that our
televisions, refrigerators, and cars might be used to reveal aspects of our
personalities that will help marketers predict our future behavior.
To be sure, sometimes Big Data has predictive power because it teases
out regularities that have little to do with personality. For example, Target
Corporation’s data miners identified a pattern whereby their female custom-
ers who suddenly started purchasing multivitamins and lotion were buying
cribs and newborn diapers six months later.102 Through analytics, Target
realized that multivitamin and lotion purchases were an indicator that the
woman was pregnant, which she might not otherwise reveal to Target. The
company used this information to its advantage and focused its efforts on
keeping a new mother’s business despite her life-changing event of preg-
nancy, which marketing research has shown to disrupt buying behavior. If
Target could make new moms into loyal customers, there was a greater
chance that it could keep them as customers in the following years.103
B. Big Data in the Law
Big Data can be used to predict future behavior because the process of
studying an individual’s purchases, online searches, borrowing activity, and
social network composition reveals aspects of that individual’s personality
and preferences. Of course, it is one thing for well-capitalized firms and
political campaigns to employ analytics at a high level and another for law-
yers or judges to duplicate the sophisticated processes. The institutional-
competence concerns are legitimate, especially at the present time, when
courts have developed no expertise in profiling or in Big Data generally.
There are several possible avenues by which Big Data could help personalize
legal default rules:
(1) Firms could use what they know about their customers to provide
them with personalized default terms and prices in contracts that are
determined at the time a contract is entered into and which any cus-
tomer could see before she executes the contract.
(2) Federal governmental regulatory agencies like the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau could identify particular default contractual provi-
sions that are well suited to particular types of consumers and require
firms to offer the terms to customers with those profiles. These terms
would also be specified at the time the contract is entered into and any
customer (or firm) could see them before contract execution.
(3) In cases where contracts are ambiguous or silent, courts could deter-
mine ex post what terms the parties probably would have specified in
101. See Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The Case of Con-
sumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 676, 699 (2012) (defining the Internet of Things as “a
connected web of ‘smart’ objects capable of generating and transmitting data on themselves”).
102. Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2012, (Magazine), at
MM30, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?_
r=0.
103. Id.
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light of similarly situated parties’ choices and preferences. The legally
relevant issue would be the parties’ observable characteristics and traits
at the time they entered into the contract (or, in the case of probate
matters, at the decedent’s death or the moment when the decedent lost
decisional capacity), as well as the parties’ past behavior. Courts would
rely on expert testimony to discern the contents of these personalized
rules. In most disputes involving incomplete contracts or ambiguous
terms, the parties would settle in the shadow of the (personalized) law.
That is, they would anticipate how a court would most likely resolve
their dispute if it were fully litigated and settle around that expected
outcome.
Due to concerns about institutional competence, we believe that the first
and second approaches are the most feasible and appropriate, although we
shall spend some time discussing the third approach as well.
We have already shown how Big Data and personalizing default rules
could change the law of inheritance.104 Let us now consider other important
applications.
1. Consumer Contracts
Consumer law is perhaps the most natural field in which to apply the
personalized default-rules approach. As we have explained, firms have an
increasingly enormous amount of data on consumers’ preferences and char-
acteristics, and they can use this data to tailor different default rules for their
contracts. The parties can use this same data to settle disputes in the shadow
of the law, and courts can use it for adjudicating unsettled disputes. Since
consumers are generally aware of their characteristics and traits, they will
find the personalized default rules more predictable than the impersonal
default rules currently applied to their contracts. A consumer who does not
know what default rules apply to her contract would be able to easily verify
it before or after the transaction takes place, either through the merchant
who could provide her with the content of those rules at the point of sale or
through intermediaries who could generate such information at low cost.
Consider Example 1 (Place of delivery), which suggests that while a de-
fault rule for consumers who are not disabled could be “delivery at the
seller’s place of business,” a “delivery at the buyer’s residence” might be a
better default rule for disabled consumers. There is little need for data to
employ a personalized default-rule approach in this case, and we would not
be surprised to see courts reaching the same result through interpretive
techniques.
In some industries, a default rule of “delivery at the buyer’s residence”
could be an efficient minoritarian default rule that would facilitate personal-
ized default rules. Thus, a store that sells medical equipment might have a
104. See supra text accompanying notes 1–5.
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relatively high number—but still a minority—of consumers who are dis-
abled. Some of the disabilities may be visually hidden, and the disabled con-
sumers might prefer not to disclose their disabilities verbally, especially if
other customers are nearby. A default rule of “delivery at the buyer’s place”
would encourage nondisabled consumers to ask for delivery at the seller’s
place, with a possible price discount.
2. Organ Donation
The United States faces a severe shortage of organs for transplantation.
About eighteen Americans die every day because of a shortage of organs
available for lifesaving transplants, and nearly 114,000 Americans were on
organ or tissue transplantation waiting lists as of 2012.105 In the United
States, organ donors must opt in to organ donation, whereas in other na-
tions people must opt out of donation, a design choice that has a very pow-
erful effect on the prevalence of organ donation.106
We think the United States default rule on organ donations is almost
certainly indefensible on welfarist grounds. Yet the rule persists. Perhaps
personalization presents a superior alternative to the status quo’s impersonal
opt-in rule. Although the question has not been studied extensively, some of
the available research demonstrates that certain personality traits correlate
with organ donation. For example, one Iranian study found that highly
agreeable individuals were more likely to agree to donate the organs of a
brain-dead loved one.107 A Turkish study found that conscientiousness and
willingness to become an organ donor were significantly correlated, and the
authors developed a personality model that could explain 19% of the re-
spondents’ variation in their intentions to become an organ donor.108 By
contrast, a larger-scale Dutch study found no significant correlations be-
tween any of the Big Five characteristics and people’s motivation to donate
their body to science.109
To address this disagreement in the literature, Matthew Kugler and Lior
Strahilevitz ran a pilot survey on Mechanical Turk, using approximately 340
research subjects. They found no statistically significant relationships be-
tween any of the Big Five characteristics and one’s status as an organ donor
105. Benny Evangelista, Online Organs, S.F. Chron., May 2, 2012, at D1, available at
http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Facebook-hopes-to-expand-organ-donation-
awareness-3525917.php.
106. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 4; Zackary Hawley et al., Increasing Organ Donation via
Changes in the Default Choice or Allocation Rule 18–19 (Ga. State Univ., Working Paper No.
2012-15, 2012), available at http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2012-
15.pdf.
107. M. Kalantari-Khandan et al., Personality Characteristics and Mental Health of Organ
Donor and Non-Donor Families, 16 World Applied Sci. J. 1183, 1187 (2012).
108. Bas¸ar Demir & G. Tarcan Kumkale, Individual Differences in Willingness to Become an
Organ Donor: A Decision Tree Approach to Reasoned Action, 55 Personality & Individual
Differences 63, 65, 67 (2013).
109. Sophie Bolt et al., Personality and Motivation for Body Donation, 193 Annals of
Anatomy 112, 114 (2011).
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or support for organ donation generally.110 Interestingly, however, when Ku-
gler and Strahilevitz measured personality using an alternative metric—the
Authoritarianism scale popularized by John Duckitt, Boris Bizumic, Stephen
Krauss, and Edna Heled111—they found consistent, significant correlations
between political–psychological orientations and status and attitudes toward
organ donation. Those who scored highest on Authoritarian-
ism–Traditionalist scales were significantly less likely to be organ donors
than those who scored lowest on those scales.112 Self-described social con-
servatives were also significantly less likely than self-described social liberals
to be organ donors and to support organ donation more generally. By itself,
social conservatism explained 9% of the variation in individuals’ propensity
to be organ donors. Nine percent is a rather meaningful number by social
science standards, although it likely does not represent a difference of suffi-
cient power to warrant different defaults on a question like organ donation.
But if a multifactor approach was capable of explaining organ-donation
preferences more accurately, then personalization of default rules based on
Authoritarianism scores and social conservatism might be appropriate.
The same correlations that proved powerful in predicting whether an
individual was or intended to become an organ donor also predicted
whether an individual was likely to support making presumed organ dona-
tion the default legal rule. Here, too, people scoring high on Authoritarian-
ism–Traditionalist scales and those who self-identified as social conservatives
were significantly less likely to support a default rule of presumed consent.
Unsurprisingly, organ donors and those intending to become donors were
far more likely to support a presumed consent default than nondonors. In
the Kugler and Strahilevitz sample, 36% of donors and intended donors
supported a presumed consent default but only 8% of nondonors supported
such a default rule. (Big Five scores did not correlate with attitudes about
the content of organ donation default rules in their sample.) The American
rule requiring organ donors to opt in is popular domestically, notwithstand-
ing its apparent responsibility for killing thousands of Americans annually.
We are not certain that a sufficiently predictive model of organ donation
based on personality, political orientation, and other aspects of individuals’
identities can be developed to enable accurate personalization of defaults. If
110. Agreeableness correlated most strongly with organ-donor status and organ-donation
support, although this correlation was not significant. Openness and neuroticism also had the
anticipated relationships with organ-donation status and attitudes, although they were also
not significant.
111. John Duckitt et al., A Tripartite Approach to Right-Wing Authoritarianism: The Au-
thoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism Model, 31 Pol. Psychol. 685 (2010).
112. The Authoritarianism–Traditionalism scale “expresses the value and motivational
goal of maintaining traditional lifestyles, norms, and morality, and resisting ‘modern’ liberal,
secular, open, lifestyles, norms, and morality.” Id. at 691. To measure Authoritarian-
ism–Traditionalism, the scholars asked survey respondents, for example, about their belief in
“old fashioned values,” their beliefs in strict adherence to “God’s laws about abortion, pornog-
raphy, and marriage,” and whether young peoples’ experimentation with drugs, alcohol, and
sex threatens societal success. Id. at 711.
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such personalization is possible, then it might permit policymakers to move
past the tired dichotomy of opt-in versus opt-out. Suppose that the Kugler
and Strahilevitz pilot study is widely replicated in the United States and
turns out to understate the magnitude of its primary effects. Then the law
might provide that only very socially liberal people who score low on Au-
thoritarianism–Traditionalism scales will be presumed to be organ donors
by default, and the rest will be deemed nondonors. Big Data sources might
clearly identify the orientation of a motorcycle victim brought into an emer-
gency room so that the default rule could be determined. This default would
then become the starting point for an examination of whether a fatally in-
jured patient expressed a view on organ donation that deviates from the
default. Employing such a personalized default rule could engender in-
creased donation rates relative to the impersonal opt-in rule of the status
quo, and it could also reflect individual preferences better than an imper-
sonal opt-out rule. Such an approach could represent a workable compro-
mise in organ transplantation law.
3. Medical Malpractice
The personalized default approach could also work in the medical mal-
practice context. Suppose that a doctor has prescribed a drug that, when
taken for a prolonged period of time, causes a very unfortunate side effect in
a very small number of patients (one in every 500,000) who take the drug
for prolonged periods. The drug is most effective when taken for a long
time, but it is still somewhat effective when taken for just a week or two. The
doctor fails to warn the patient about this particular side effect, and the
patient suffers the effect and then sues the doctor for malpractice, alleging a
failure to obtain informed consent. A key focus of the legal inquiry will be
causation: Would the patient have consented to undergo the treatment even
if she had been warned about the side effect? As long as the doctor has no
concrete information about the particular patient’s wishes or expectations
regarding disclosure, presently the law treats this inquiry as an objective one:
What would a reasonably prudent patient have done?113
Our approach contemplates a rule whereby a physician can tailor her
disclosure of risks to particular patients—even though she has no concrete
information about the particular patient’s wishes or expectations regarding
disclosure. The physician will then be judged based on whether her disclo-
sure was appropriate for a particular patient type (rather than for the hypo-
thetical reasonably prudent patient).
Big Data firms like the Fair Isaac Corporation (“FICO”) have already
gotten into the business of using data mining to predict patients’ future be-
havior, as evidenced by the firm’s having recently launched its FICO Adher-
ence Scoring. FICO Adherence Scores use information from a patient’s
credit report to predict the likelihood that a patient will regularly take his
113. See, e.g., Canesi ex rel. Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805, 812 (N.J. 1999).
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prescription medication and otherwise adhere to medical advice.114 Suppose
a doctor consulted a patient’s FICO Adherence Score, and FICO predicted
that there was only a 5% chance that the patient would take the medication
for long enough to render the side effect a possibility. The doctor does some
quick math and determines that the risk that this particular patient would
suffer the side effect is 1 in 10 million. Given that any warning may cause
psychosomatic symptoms or raise the likelihood of cognitive errors by the
patient, the doctor elects not to warn the patient.115 In our analysis, a default
rule of nondisclosure would be appropriate for this particular patient.
At the same time, if the same doctor were treating a different patient,
one for whom FICO predicted a 95% chance that the patient would con-
tinue taking the medication for long enough to trigger a possible side effect,
then the court’s ruling could well come out differently. The odds of the side
effect occurring for this patient are approximately 1 in 526,000,116 and these
odds, while remote, might still be sufficient to warrant disclosure to the
patient. Personalizing the default rule permits the physician to practice per-
sonalized medicine to a much greater degree—a development that could
substantially advance the efficiency of health-care delivery.117
Pushing the point further, we might imagine ways in which other forms
of Big Data could affect the informed-consent calculus. One of the other
functions of credit scoring is to assess an individual’s tolerance for risk. Risk
is apparently correlated across a number of life activities, such that individu-
als who drive in a risky manner make risky personal financial decisions as
well.118 Suppose that a plaintiff’s consumer behavior profile reveals that she
is an extremely cautious person. In this case, the law might impose height-
ened disclosure requirements on the physician. If the patient’s profile reveals
that she is a devil-may-care consumer, then giving short shrift to disclosures
of low risks may be appropriate for the physician in a world where disclosure
114. Jeremy M. Simon, New Medical FICO Score Sparks Controversy, Questions, Credit-
Cards.com (July 28, 2011), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/fico-score-medica-
tion-adherence-1270.php.
115. See generally Gil Siegal et al., Personalized Disclosure by Information-on-Demand: At-
tending to Patients’ Needs in the Informed Consent Process, 40 J.L. Med. & Ethics 359, 360
(2012) (discussing the issues doctors consider when determining how much information to
provide to patients in attempting to gain informed consent).
116. With a 95% chance that the patient would consume the drug for a long enough time
to render the side effect a possibility, the risk of the side effect is 19 times higher than with a
5% chance. We assume for purposes of simplicity that once the patient uses the drug for a
sufficient amount of time, the side effect’s likelihood does not increase with the time of con-
sumption. Relaxing this assumption would enhance the risk differentials between the two hy-
pothetical patients.
117. See Gary E. Marchant, Foreword: Law and the New Era of Personalized Medicine, 48
Jurimetrics J. 131 (2008) (introducing a symposium on the law of personalized medicine).
118. Edward R. Morrison & Arpit Gupta, Health Shocks and Household Financial Fragil-
ity: Evidence from Automobile Crashes and Consumer Bankruptcy Filings 3 (Feb. 13, 2013)
(unpublished draft), available at http://economics.uchicago.edu/workshops/Morrison%20Ed-
ward%20Health%20Shocks.pdf.
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may be both time consuming and potentially harmful to the patient’s emo-
tional well-being. Such an approach to adjudicating medical malpractice
cases, where the patient’s profile at the time the medication was prescribed is
part of the factual record before the court, may help steer adjudicators away
from the dangers of hindsight bias. In these cases, the judge or jury knows
that a bad outcome has occurred and is tempted to think that a reasonable
patient would have wanted to know about the possibility of such an out-
come, even though the ex ante risk of this outcome was extremely remote.119
The (hopefully rare) patient whom FICO or other providers of analytics
misunderstand would have the chance to opt out. Under a new version of
informed consent, the physician may tell a patient, “This is the sort of per-
son our analytics contractor thinks you are. If we have misunderstood you,
please tell us now, because it will affect the facts I disclose to you and the
circumstances that will prompt me to ask for further consent or clarifica-
tion.”120 We will say more about this sort of personalized disclosure in Part
IV.
In other contexts, personalized informed-consent default rules could
further the interests of third parties. Consider vaccination: children are vac-
cinated from diseases, but it is often in a particular child’s best interest,
strictly speaking, not to take the vaccine—which has possible side effects—
because the rest of the population is vaccinated, thereby reducing the
chances the child will come into contact with the disease. To avoid such free
riding, a mandatory law could force vaccination. A softer approach would
set an impersonal default rule according to which doctors could say nothing
about side effects unless asked; they would proceed with the vaccination
119. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 571, 615–16 (1998) (discussing medical malpractice litigation and hindsight
bias).
120. For more on the benefits and perils of such discussion, see infra text accompanying
notes 225–230.
In two interesting papers that appeared just as the final version of this Article was going
to press, Annette Rid and David Wendler advocate the use of a “Patient Preference Predictor”
that would predict “incapacitated patients’ treatment preferences based on their individual
characteristics and information on how these characteristics influence individuals’ preferences
regarding treatment during periods of decisional incapacity.” Annette Rid & David Wendler,
Treatment Decision Making for Incapacitated Patients: Is Development and Use of a Patient Pref-
erence Predictor Feasible?, 39 J. Med. & Phil. 130, 131 (2014) [hereinafter Rid & Wendler,
Feasibility]; see also Annette Rid & David Wendler, Use of a Patient Preference Predictor to Help
Make Medical Decisions for Incapacitated Patients, 39 J. Med. & Phil. 104 (2014) [hereinafter
Rid & Wendler, Predictor]. Their proposed approach relies on surveys, Rid & Wendler, Predic-
tor, supra, at 112, rather than analysis of observed behavior and guinea-pig matching. See
discussion infra text accompanying note 150. Rid and Wendler advocate the use of Patient
Preference Predictors to inform treatment decisions that a nondecisional patient’s health-care
surrogate must make, in a manner that might alleviate conflict among relatives and reduce the
surrogate’s anxiety about whether those decisions conform to what the patient would have
wanted were she still able to express a preference. Rid & Wendler, Predictor, supra, at 113, 117.
Alternatively, they suggest that the results of the predictor could be used to generate default
rules in this particular health-care context. Rid & Wendler, Feasibility, supra, at 147. For a legal
scholar’s response to Rid & Wendler’s proposal, see Rebecca Dresser, Law, Ethics, and the
Patient Preference Predictor, 39 J. Med. & Phil. 178 (2014).
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unless told otherwise. An even better approach—in a world where, say,
80–90% vaccination suffices to create herd immunity, and 10% of the popu-
lation is likely to suffer side effects from vaccination—would be to personal-
ize the disclosure default. For example, the “no information unless the
patient asked” default rule would not apply to patients whose attributes cor-
relate most closely with those of patients who have suffered side effects in
Food and Drug Administration trials.
Resources like FICO Adherence Scores are not the only tool that could
be used to personalize the law of informed consent and medical malpractice.
Some research suggests that Big Five neuroticism/emotional stability scores
can help predict hypochondria.121 In light of concerns about a hypochon-
driac’s psychosomatic response to being told about a given side effect, physi-
cians might appropriately elect to inform an emotionally stable patient
about a very unlikely side effect while offering information about the same
side effect to a highly neurotic patient only if asked. In this sense, using Big
Data tools to assess personality, which can in turn help a physician personal-
ize disclosures to a patient, could have significant therapeutic value.
4. Landlord–Tenant Law
We believe that personalized default rules are appropriate in adjudicat-
ing disputes in property law as well. Suppose a landlord and tenant are in-
volved in litigation. The tenant lives alone and has rented a two-bedroom
apartment for $600 a month in a neighborhood where the average similarly
sized apartment rents for twice that amount. The written lease specifies the
rent, the term, and various other factors, but it says nothing about the qual-
ity of the apartment. Now suppose that a few months after the tenant moves
in, plaster begins falling from the ceiling in the second bedroom, making it
an unsafe space for sleeping, although the tenant continues to use the bed-
room for storing personal belongings. Has the condition in the second bed-
room amounted to a breach of the lease, such that if the ceiling is not
repaired upon request the tenant can move out and stop paying rent? In
most American jurisdictions, the answer to this question is yes. The condi-
tion of the ceiling constitutes a breach of the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity, which is read into every landlord–tenant contract.122 In some
jurisdictions, however, the implied warranty of habitability functions as a
default provision that the parties can waive via explicit contract terms.123
American law has largely stuck with a one-size-fits-all approach to the
implied warranty of habitability, although the limited exceptions are impor-
tant for our purposes. As a general matter, the implied warranty of habita-
bility will be read into any residential lease. But some jurisdictions hold that
there will be no such warranty when the tenant rents a single-family home
121. Eamonn Ferguson, Personality as a Predictor of Hypochondriacal Concerns: Results
from Two Longitudinal Studies, 56 J. Psychosomatic Res. 307, 311 (2004).
122. See, e.g., Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 207 (Vt. 1984).
123. See, e.g., P.H. Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1021–22 (Utah 1991).
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(as opposed to a unit in a multiunit building),124 and other jurisdictions
recognize nothing akin to an implied warranty of habitability when nonresi-
dential properties are leased.125 This granularity of the rules is based on
common law courts’ suppositions that particular variables governing prop-
erty ought to affect the tenant’s substantive legal rights.126
Our approach to personalized default rules posits that the characteristics
of the tenant (and landlord) may be relevant to determining the appropriate
missing term to impose on the contract. This is particularly true when the
landlord has access to information relating to the tenant’s past behavior,
characteristics, and traits, or to other data indicating the suitable default
rules for the tenant. Compared with tenants with similar incomes, is this
tenant routinely willing to sacrifice quality in return for cost savings? If so,
the court ought to view the lease as lacking an implied warranty of habita-
bility. Is the tenant someone who stays in nice hotels far more frequently
than most travelers with similar incomes, pays for weekly maid service, and
otherwise indicates a propensity for paying for comfort and pleasing aesthet-
ics? If so, the court ought to view the lease as containing an implied war-
ranty of habitability. Does the tenant score high on personality metrics
measuring neuroticism, such that the prospect of problems with the ceiling
will keep her awake at night? Or is she a very emotionally stable person who
may be annoyed but will not be made anxious by her substandard ceiling?127
We are not suggesting that these intuitive correlations among purchas-
ing history, personality, and expectations for an apartment are airtight. We
are articulating falsifiable hypotheses that ought to be tested empirically. But
since at least the mid-1990s, consumer profilers have been able to analyze a
broad swath of personal information relating to transactions and to use al-
gorithms to identify “value oriented” or “Rodeo Drive Chic” consumers for
marketing purposes.128
5. Labor Law
American labor law is not often thought of in terms of default rules, but
defaults are very important in this field. More precisely, the default provi-
sion under the National Labor Relations Act is that workers are not union-
ized. If a group of workers mount a unionization drive and a majority of the
workers (or, in some cases, a majority of a subset of the nonmanagement
workers) within a workplace vote to unionize, then a union will be certified,
and it will be authorized to bargain collectively on behalf of all the workers
124. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Moore, 441 N.E.2d 690, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
125. See, e.g., K & S Enters. v. Kennedy Office Supply Co., 520 S.E.2d. 122, 126 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1999).
126. Note the similarities to the U.C.C.’s treatment of unique and nonunique goods. See
supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
127. A counterargument is that an implied warranty of habitability should apply to any
tenant unless he explicitly waves it. We develop this point further infra in text accompanying
notes 174–175.
128. See Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
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as a whole.129 Union certification efforts can be cumbersome, expensive, and
contentious. At the same time, it seems plausible that American law’s chosen
default rule is an appropriate one on majoritarian grounds—most American
workers are nonunionized and have been for quite some time.130
Psychological studies have shown that personality characteristics corre-
late strongly with membership in a voluntary union. In particular, the Big
Five traits of extraversion and neuroticism both predict union membership,
and the interaction of these two traits predicts union membership very
strongly.131 Big Five personality characteristics also predict which industries
individuals are likely to be drawn to and which individuals are most likely to
thrive and retain their jobs in particular industries. For example, nurses who
report high levels of neuroticism are much more likely to experience emo-
tional exhaustion and burnout, which may cause them to leave nursing,
whereas nurses with high levels of extraversion are likely to avoid burnout.132
And while politicians score very high on extraversion and openness, bureau-
crats do not.133 Managers and sales representatives show high levels of extra-
version,134 and the unemployed commonly evince high levels of
neuroticism.135
This kind of data suggests a radical possibility, which is that certain
workplaces or industries, especially those containing high numbers of very
extraverted and neurotic individuals, might be deemed unionized by de-
fault.136 Given the underrepresentation of highly neurotic individuals in the
workforce, the nonunionized default plausibly makes sense for most
workplaces.
129. What We Do: Conduct Elections, Nat’l Lab. Rel. Board, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-
we-do/conduct-elections (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
130. Union Members Summary, Bureau of Lab. Stat., (Jan. 24, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://
www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. An important caveat is in order. We do not know
about workers’ preferences regarding unionization in an environment where there are no
transaction costs for forming a union. Moreover, some workers’ decisions not to be part of a
union may result from coercion or collective action problems. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Commu-
nication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of Discourse in the Regulation of Employee Collective Ac-
tion, 44 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1091, 1097, 1126–27 (2011).
131. K.R. Parkes & T.D.B. Razavi, Personality and Attitudinal Variables as Predictors of
Voluntary Union Membership, 37 Personality & Individual Differences 333, 342–43
(2004).
132. See Kelly L. Zellars et al., Burnout in Health Care: The Role of the Five Factors of
Personality, 30 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 1570, 1588–89 (2000).
133. Michael Ashton et al., Personality Traits of Municipal Politicians and Staff, 50 Can.
Pub. Admin. 273, 285 (2007).
134. Barrick & Mount, supra note 84, at 19.
135. Vijaya Murali & Femi Oyebode, Poverty, Social Inequality and Mental Health, 10 Ad-
vances in Psychiatric Treatment 216 (2004).
136. We ignore the (realistic) problem of multiple unions competing to represent the
same workforce. See generally Agnes Akkerman, Union Competition and Strikes: The Need for
Analysis at the Sector Level, 61 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 445, 446–49 (2008) (reviewing com-
parative data on competition among unions); Ann C. Hodges, Southern Solutions for Wisconsin
Woes, 43 U. Tol. L. Rev. 633, 647 (2012) (discussing informal noncompetition arrangements
among unions in Virginia).
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At this point, we want to identify this kind of workplace profiling to
determine the default rule as a theoretical possibility rather than as some-
thing we are advocating. Correlation and causation are distinct, and the fac-
tors that drive union membership continue to be debated.137 For example, it
is plausible that extraversion and neuroticism explain the success of unioni-
zation campaigns rather than workers’ underlying preference for union
membership. It is even conceivable that correlation runs in the opposite di-
rection and that participation in a union makes workers more extraverted
and neurotic. We would need to get a fuller sense of these causal variables
before offering prescriptions for labor law. That said, depending on the re-
sults of future research, a prounionization default rule could be appropriate
in some contexts.
C. Big Data Guinea Pigs
Countries with enormous populations ought to take advantage of econ-
omies of scale. In this case, that would mean forgoing the careful monitoring
of all their citizens’ choices and perhaps sidestepping some of the problems
from inefficient social norms in the process. We therefore propose that
American law ask 1 million guinea-pig residents to make active choices
about their preferences, which the law would then data mine to identify the
ways in which the other 314 million individual Americans are similar to the
1 million guinea pigs.138 The law would provide modest compensation to the
guinea pigs for the costs they incurred in the process. The guinea pigs’ active
choices would then become the personalized default choices for the people
most similar to them across a variety of observable metrics. These surveys
could be conducted through a governmental agency, like the Census Bureau
or Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, or through an industry
consortium.
A great deal of contract law scholarship concerns the extent to which
consumers are rushed or inattentive and pay little attention to contract
terms as a result.139 Yet, if one in every 314 people is a compensated con-
tract-law guinea pig,140 then the law might reasonably devote substantial re-
sources to making sure that these guinea pigs are very well informed and
have adequate time to consider the contractual options and associated trade-
offs. The guinea pigs would spend time reading the fine print so others do
not have to. Once an entity—presumably a governmental agency—has as-
sembled a large dataset to track the choices of these guinea pigs, the entity
137. An introductory analysis of these questions is offered in Nicola-Maria Riley, Determi-
nants of Union Membership: A Review, 11 Labour 265 (1997).
138. See infra Section II.C.
139. See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the
Recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts”, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev.
165, 182 (2011) (pointing out that almost no consumer making transactions through the in-
ternet read the contract before accepting it).
140. The guinea pigs’ attributes and decisions would be closely scrutinized so that other
people would not need to be subjected to high decision costs and such exacting scrutiny.
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can identify behavioral patterns and facilitate efforts by firms to give each
consumer a set of default contractual terms that mimic those chosen by the
guinea pigs with the personalities and attributes most similar to hers. We
envision a “clustering” approach for identifying coherent groups of people
to whom particular personalized default rules will apply.141 Only the choices
made by the guinea pigs prior to the time the contract at issue was executed
would matter.
In a recent article, Ayres and Schwartz propose that firms be required to
survey their customers about whether particular terms in a contract are con-
sistent with their expectations.142 Terms that surprised many consumers or
that had surprising and very bad consequences for a smaller number of con-
sumers would need to be set apart in a special box designed to prompt
consumers to pay more attention to such terms.143 A consumer-voting
mechanism could ensure that the most surprising or most disadvantageous
terms appear most prominently in the special box.144 Ayres and Schwartz’s
proposal somewhat resembles our approaches to defaults and disclosure.145
But whereas Ayres and Schwartz propose an impersonal approach to deter-
mining which contract terms are problematic, our approach is personalized.
It recognizes that different terms will be problematic to different types of
people, so the “boxes” or defaults that different sorts of people are shown
should differ systematically.
Our “sampling” strategy mirrors the sorts of extrapolations that demog-
raphers and survey researchers routinely use in their work.146 And the pri-
vate sector already uses such strategies for predictive purposes. For example,
Netflix’s Cinematch algorithm for movie ratings (a) analyzes the one- to
five-star ratings provided by its users after they have seen a movie; (b)
matches each user’s ratings with the ratings of other users in the Netflix
database; and (c) uses these similarity scores to predict how much users will
like particular movies. Users can then employ these predictions in deciding
which films to rent or stream.147 The more films a user rates, the better the
141. Obviously, the devil is in the details with respect to how these clusters will be created
and what happens to consumers whose profiles place them at the borderline between different
clusters. For further discussion, see Ankit Agrawal et al., High Performance Big Data Clustering,
in Cloud Computing and Big Data 192 (Charlie Catlett et al. eds., 2013).
142. Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66
Stan. L. Rev. 545 (2014).
143. Id. at 583.
144. Id. at 584.
145. See infra Part IV.
146. The closest analogue for the guinea pigs proposal in existing legal scholarship would
be the sort of legal experimentation proposed in Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law,
159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 929 (2011) (proposing randomized trials to test the efficacy of laws and
regulations). For another recent article advocating greater regulatory experimentalism, espe-
cially continuous learning and updating, see Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimal-
ism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 Geo. L.J. 53 (2011).
147. See Clive Thompson, If You Liked This, You’re Sure to Love That, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23,
2008, (Magazine), at MM74, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/magazine/23
Netflix-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
1452 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:1417
algorithm can personalize the user’s movie recommendations and the rec-
ommendations of similar Netflix customers.
Of course, rating each movie on Netflix entails an active choice. Many
Netflix users do not bother to evaluate movies they have seen, perhaps be-
cause it is time consuming.148 And many Netflix users similarly do not use
the “taste preferences” features, which permit users to specify how often they
watch movies that can be characterized as “absurd,” “bawdy,” “cerebral,”
“dark,” etc.149 One of the potential benefits of personalized default rules in a
world of Big Data is that much of the data used to generate similarity scores
and personalized defaults will be generated automatically, without requiring
the user to do anything. It is almost tantamount to Netflix monitoring how
many times a viewer laughed during a comedy, cried during a tragedy, or
gasped during a horror flick.
A more modest alternative to using guinea pigs would be to generate
information necessary for personalizing default rules by asking individuals
about their general preferences, characteristics, and traits, as well as about
their past behaviors, and using this information to tailor default rules for
them. An agency might distribute questionnaires to consumers, explaining
that the answers will be used for personalizing default rules in their interac-
tions with merchants. We predict that many consumers will answer the
questionnaires, which should not be too intrusive, with the understanding
that their answers would facilitate their receiving deals better adapted to
their true preferences. The gist of the approach is to use information culled
from a survey to modify defaults that a consumer will encounter. This blan-
ket approach to personalizing default rules seems far more efficient than
selective modifications of contractual boilerplate on a transaction-by-trans-
action basis. We propose that individuals should be able to see the “profile”
constructed for them and change this profile if it does not fit their true
preferences.150
In any event, in modern, high-stakes transactions, it is becoming in-
creasingly common for sellers to have information about the consumers they
are dealing with, which enables them to decide on pricing and service qual-
ity, pinpoint potentially fraudulent transactions, and evaluate the effective-
ness of their marketing strategies.151 As the information age proceeds, it will
be reasonable to assume that sellers “know their customers” and either al-
ready are or can easily become familiar with the personalized default rules
that correspond to particular customers.
148. See id. Another reason users might not rate movies is that they do not think their
opinion of a particular film is any of Netflix’s business (or the business of anyone with whom
Netflix might share data). Seen from this perspective, seamless, automatic sharing is more
troubling than the sharing via active choices that occurs with Netflix’s system.
149. Taste Preferences, Netflix, http://dvd.netflix.com/TastePreferences (last visited Jan.
25, 2014).
150. Securing individuals’ active participation in constructing their profiles could also oc-
cur under our guinea-pigs scheme: each individual would be able to identify her profile and
request changes to it.
151. See, e.g., Duhigg, supra note 102.
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Consumers are less likely to have this sort of information about individ-
ual firms’ propensities, although in the case of large national firms or local
firms with extensive Yelp profiles, the information asymmetries may be less
pronounced. Imposing on consumers a burden to “know their sellers” is less
justifiable, particularly when they are dealing with small-scale sellers in non-
repeat-play environments.152
III. Possible Objections and Limitations
Part II articulated a rather bold vision of personalized default rules. In
this Part, we want to confront some potential objections to our proposal
while conceding that some of these objections warrant limiting the appro-
priate scope for personalized default rules.
A. Cross Subsidies
An obvious objection to our proposal relates to the equities and ineffi-
ciencies of cross subsidization. In our analysis, two consumers might buy the
same product for the same price but receive a different set of contractual
rights as part of the transaction. That might be unjust and inefficient.
Consider the following example:
Example 3. Right to return. Dana is conservative, very careful in her behav-
ior in all fields of life. She is a cautious consumer: before she buys any-
thing, she consults Consumer Reports and asks for her friends’ advice. In
the past, she has never returned a product she bought, unless it was defec-
tive. Jim is a risk taker who is quite impulsive and excitable. He makes
decisions fast, without consulting anyone. In the past, he returned products
he bought several times just because he realized he should not have bought
them in the first place. Both Dana and Jim have separately bought a new
flat-screen television at the same store. After a day of using the new televi-
sion, they each realized that this purchase was a mistake. They want to
return the product and get their money back. Should they be treated in the
same manner?
Under current law, the answer is yes. Whether the default rule is a “right to
return”153 or “no right to return,” it would apply equally to Dana and Jim.
If, however, personalized default rules are permitted and feasible, Jim should
arguably enjoy the right to return but Dana should not because Jim needs it
more. Since the buyer’s exercise of such a right is costly for the seller and
since both Dana and Jim paid the same price, the result would be that care-
ful Dana subsidizes hasty Jim—a result that is both unjust and inefficient.
Upon closer scrutiny, a personalized default rule in Example 3 would be
different and is preferable to an impersonalized default rule, especially if the
152. For further thoughts on this point, see infra Section III.C.
153. In New York, unless the retailer opts out by displaying a “return and refund policy,”
the default rule provides a right to return for cash up to thirty days after the purchase. See N.Y.
Gen. Bus. Law § 218-a (McKinney 2012); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1723 (West 2009) (apply-
ing the same default as in New York).
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impersonalized rule contains a right to return.154 With an impersonalized
default rule, both Dana and Jim pay the same price and get the same default
rule of a right to return. But since Jim uses this right more often than Dana,
Dana subsidizes Jim through the contract price.
With a personalized default rule, the cross subsidization either disap-
pears or at least diminishes. It disappears if both the default rule and the
price are personalized. In this scenario, if either Dana or Jim gets the right to
return, he or she pays a price reflecting the expected cost of each of them
exercising the right, resulting in no cross subsidization. But even if prices are
not adapted to the personalized default rule, the cross subsidization would
diminish. This would occur because the efficient personalized default rule
for Jim is probably no right to return, and the efficient counterpart rule for
Dana is probably a right to return. Although Jim ostensibly needs the right
to return more than Dana because he exercise it more often, he uses the
right more frequently precisely because Dana subsidizes him. With such per-
sonalized default rules, there would still be some cross subsidization—now
Jim subsidizes Dana—but the level of such subsidization would be lower
than it would under an impersonal default rule where both Dana and Jim
have the right to return.
B. Strategic Behavior
Crude personalized default rules tied to an individual’s immutable char-
acteristics, such as sex or age, alleviate significant concerns about strategic
behavior. Under our proposal for granular personalized default rules, how-
ever, the products and services that an individual buys, the keywords he uses
in his searches, the company he keeps, and various other aspects of his be-
havior can influence the terms under which he will purchase goods and
services. When an individual consumer changes his behavior, he is simulta-
neously changing the identities of the guinea pigs with whom he will be
compared. In effect, the consumer trades default rules: he replaces the rules
selected by the guinea pigs who used to behave like him for the rules selected
by the guinea pigs who behave like the “new him.” Given this possibility,
there is a danger that individual consumers will engage in strategic behavior
to ensure that they are compared to the guinea pigs who have selected the
most generous default terms.
To take a salient example of this problem, a Canadian credit-card issuer
determined during the last decade that consumers who purchase carbon
monoxide detectors or felt pads to be placed at the bottom of chair and
furniture legs are exceptionally low credit risks.155 Evidently, people con-
cerned about the dangers of carbon monoxide or intent on preventing
154. If the impersonal default rule is “no right to return,” there is no cross subsidization,
although not every consumer gets her preferred default rule, a problem that our personalized
default-rule regime aims to resolve.
155. Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit-Card Company Know About You?, N.Y.
Times, May 17, 2009, (Magazine), at MM40, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/
magazine/17credit-t.html?pagewanted=all.
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scratches on hardwood floors are extremely careful, conscientious individu-
als with low discount rates; they are precisely the sort of people likely to
repay loans on time.156 Before it publicized this finding, the credit-card is-
suer could use its knowledge of felt pad and carbon monoxide–detector
purchases to price risk. But as soon as the correlation became public, its
value diminished substantially. After all, felt pads and carbon monoxide de-
tectors are relatively inexpensive compared to home-mortgage loans. It
would be in everyone’s interests to stock up on these household products a
few months before seeking to purchase a house, even if they had no inten-
tion of putting these items to their ordinary use. In this way, the strategic
purchase of felt pads and carbon monoxide detectors would function as a
smoke screen.157
Although the problem of strategic behavior is always an issue, we do not
think it is particularly troublesome in this context. First, a great deal of pre-
dictive analytics is and will remain proprietary. Guessing which products
function as felt pads will not be easy, and people who discover how to game
the system will have little incentive to disclose publicly their success stories.
Second, even when it becomes clear that certain types of behavior will be
associated with more beneficial default terms in some contexts, employing
smoke screens is costly. If people regularly purchase products they do not
need, become Facebook friends with people they do not like, or develop
hobbies they do not enjoy in order to enhance the quality of their personal-
ized default profiles, they often will be making themselves worse off. Chang-
ing one’s behavior is a costly signal; it is not cheap talk. Much of the time it
will be easier just to specify a different contractual term when entering into
a contract—or simply pay a higher price—rather than putting on an elabo-
rate and costly performance to achieve the same result. Third, while main-
taining a charade may be easy for a short period of time, it gets harder for
the consumer (and easier for the seller to detect) with every passing day.
Thus, in Example 3 (Right to return), if hasty Jim pretended to be careful
and hence obtained a right to return, after he abuses this right several times,
merchants would recognize his true character and treat him accordingly.
Fourth, on many occasions, consumers will not really benefit from pretend-
ing to be what they are not: possessing a specific character could benefit a
consumer in one context but harm him in another context, and in many
instances, faking it could cause a consumer to be presented with various
default rules that do not fit him personally.
While we think strategic behavior is a manageable problem associated
with personalized default rules, expanding personalization beyond waivable
defaults would magnify the problem. Personalized default rules could poten-
tially become so ingrained that sellers essentially refuse to bargain around
them. In other words, firms might be willing to offer consumers contracts
with personalized terms but might view negotiating around the personalized
156. Id.
157. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Signaling Exhaustion and Perfect Exclusion, 10 J. on
Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 321, 327 (2012).
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terms as prohibitive because of the high transaction costs. Such a progres-
sion away from personalized default rules and toward unwaivable “personal-
ized terms” strikes us as a sufficiently thorny topic to warrant an article of its
own. But we suspect that society will not need to cross this bridge, at least
not in the immediate future, in part because the strategic behavior problem
would be substantially magnified in a world where most terms were
nonnegotiable.
C. Abuse by Merchants
Another potential objection to our proposal—mostly relevant to con-
sumer law—is that merchants could abuse the availability of large amounts
of data to the detriment of consumers. When one party to a contract knows
a lot about the other party’s preferences but not vice versa, the party with
more knowledge may enjoy a substantial advantage over the other party and
extract a larger share of the contractual surplus. This risk materializes once
we assume that the market is not fully competitive and that consumers are
not fully informed. To illustrate this point, suppose a merchant knows that a
specific consumer is highly risk averse. The merchant may then overcharge
this consumer for decreasing her risks. More generally, data about consum-
ers’ preferences could indicate their willingness to pay for a certain product
or service, thereby facilitating price discrimination.
We concede that this objection has force, although it is important to
understand the precise nature of this force and the countervailing considera-
tions. Firms already gather enormous amounts of information about indi-
viduals and use this information to boost their bottom line. This trend has
its own economic rationale, and our proposal would have at most a margi-
nal effect on it. That said, when all consumers are offered the same terms,
price discrimination is easy to identify. When all consumers are offered per-
sonalized terms, however, price discrimination becomes much harder to
spot. That which is hard to detect is more difficult to oppose and therefore
tougher to deter.
Of course, price discrimination has ambiguous welfare effects. It tends
to raise output, enabling consumers who otherwise could not obtain a good
or service to do so, as well as to maximize producer surplus. The availability
of personalized default terms is also designed to provide consumers with
deals that better reflect their personalities and thereby encourage more con-
sumers to enter into transactions with firms.158 Indeed, we might concep-
tualize personalizing contractual terms as enabling consumers to reclaim
some of the firms’ surplus. Determining the dynamic effects of these simul-
taneous changes in consumer welfare is extremely tricky. In any event, it
would be unwise to reject personalization solely on price-discrimination
grounds.
158. For a lengthier discussion, see Strahilevitz, supra note 68, at 2027–29.
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D. Uncertainty
According to a fourth objection, adopting a personalized default-rule
regime would increase uncertainty, thereby making the law less effective in
guiding people’s behavior. Personal default rules may also increase the costs
of adjudication.159 Impersonal default rules, by contrast, avoid these
drawbacks.
An approach to contract law that locks in the guinea pigs’ choices before
the contract’s execution would ameliorate any uncertainty created by per-
sonalized default rules. Any subsequent shifts in the guinea pigs’ choices
would be irrelevant to the meaning of a contract. This is the primary ap-
proach we advocate here. Mechanically, a consumer would be entitled to ask
at the point of sale what personalized terms her consumer profile generates
for her, and the firm would respond with a disclosure of the terms. Because
the entire process would be automated, producing this information for con-
sumers would not slow down transactions. While the consumer’s review of
the default terms might delay the transaction, the same is true of existing,
written contract terms.
To better understand the uncertainty objection to our personalized de-
fault-rule regime, reconsider Example 3 (Right to return). If there is a one-
size-fits-all default rule—either a right to return or no right to return—
contractual parties could clearly understand whether in a specific transac-
tion they have such a right. Similarly, in Example 2 (Specific performance or
damages), if the choice of remedy is not contingent on the buyers’ character-
istics and traits, both Steven and Sarah could know in advance that in the
event of a breach, they are entitled to specific performance (or damages),
regardless of the inferences that could be derived from their particular traits.
With personalized default rules, there is more uncertainty: in the two exam-
ples above, contracting parties would find it harder to contemplate their
substantive rights and remedies.160
The choice between personalized default rules and impersonal default
rules only loosely tracks the choice between rules and standards, which com-
mentators have thoroughly analyzed.161 Most importantly, rules are more
costly to create, but standards are more costly both for individuals to inter-
pret when deciding how to behave and for adjudicators to apply in evaluat-
ing past behaviors.162 At first glance, an impersonal default rule ostensibly
159. Ayres, supra note 9, at 13 (discussing the complexity costs of tailoring default rules).
160. Cf. Geis, supra note 10, at 1124–29 (discussing transaction costs, and other costs, of
tailoring default rules).
161. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J.
557 (1992) (describing the tradeoff between the use of rules and standards in law generally);
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685
(1976) (introducing the distinction between rules and standards).
162. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
Legal Stud. 257, 262–71 (1974) (comparing rules and standards on the complexity dimen-
sion); Kaplow, supra note 161 (comparing rules with standards in various dimensions).
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resembles a rule while a personalized default rule seems to resemble a stan-
dard. Thus, in Examples 2 and 3, an impersonal default rule (such as “dam-
ages” or “right to return,” respectively) is a rule while a personalized default
rule is a standard.
The rules-versus-standards dichotomy is not identical to the imper-
sonal-versus-personalized default-rules dichotomy. In particular, there could
be impersonal default rules that are standards (e.g., a duty of good faith)
and personalized default rules that are rules (e.g., different intestacy rules for
men and women).163 Therefore, the crucial questions with personalized de-
fault rules are how to balance uncertainty with accuracy, better reduce trans-
action costs, encourage desirable behaviors, and meet people’s reasonable
expectations.
Would a personalized default rule typically be more associated with un-
certainty than would an impersonal default rule? Not necessarily. A con-
sumer living in a world with impersonal default rules would need to invest
resources in learning the content of the default rule (or bear the risks of
failing to do so). A consumer living in a world with personalized default
rules would need to invest resources in learning the content of whichever
default rule applies to him, and he may also need to research other plausibly
applicable default rules along the way. Critically, the consumer already
knows a great deal about his preferences and characteristics, which are the
factors driving the choice among multiple personalized default rules. As-
suming that Big Data does what it is supposed to do—identify patterns of
behavior among similarly situated people—then the consumer will be able
to intuit the law’s contents based on what he himself would want, which
would be a good proxy for the choices of guinea pigs just like him. It is
therefore conceivable that the average consumer can discern the contents of
applicable personalized default rules at a lower cost than he can discern the
contents of an impersonal default rule, and he may very well be able to do so
without consulting a lawyer.164
A caveat is in order. In our model, the guinea pigs are given more time
and resources to make decisions, and it is conceivable that this extra time
will cause them to make decisions that differ from the snap judgments that
they (and those like them) would have made. If this gap is large, the effect
will be greater consumer uncertainty combined with greater consumer satis-
faction with their default choices. At worst, this seems likely to be a wash.
Over time, many consumers may stop worrying so much about uncertainty,
in the same way that consumers quickly overcame their widespread initial
reluctance to purchase products over the internet using credit cards.165 For
163. See Geis, supra note 10, at 1116–19 (distinguishing among simple rules, complex
rules, simple standards, and complex standards).
164. Geis comes tantalizingly close to making this important point but instead goes in a
more familiar direction, using the heterogeneity of actors to whom rules are tailored to discuss
the transaction costs associated with rejecting a default rule. See id. at 1122–23.
165. Thompson S.H. Teo, Attitudes Toward Online Shopping and the Internet, 21 Behav. &
Info. Tech. 259, 265 (2002) (noting that in 2002 consumer concerns about the security of
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the consumers who remain mistrustful, our proposal for personalized dis-
closure in Part IV offers a novel strategy for ameliorating the uncertainty
problem.
In contracts between two consumers, especially consumers involved in
non-repeat-play interactions, the uncertainty will rise dramatically, which is
why we are quite skeptical about using personalized default rules in those
contexts. But in contracts between a consumer and a profit-maximizing firm
or between consumers involved in repeat-play interactions, the cognitive
load faced directly by consumers should be more manageable.166 Contracting
firms may face information asymmetries regarding consumer preferences,
but reducing these asymmetries is one of the Big Data industry’s chief
objectives.
Matters would become more complicated if courts entered the business
of personalizing default rules. If judges are not skilled at identifying litigants’
characteristics and preferences, then adjudicators’ cognitive loads will rise as
a result of the shift from impersonal to personalized default rules. And as
these cognitive loads rise, the risk of judicial error increases, which will en-
gender uncertainty for the parties themselves, even if these parties have per-
fect information about their own preferences and characteristics. As this
analysis shows, the heightened uncertainty created by personalized default
rules is likely to emerge indirectly, as a “shadow of the law” effect.167
Notwithstanding these substantial concerns about personalization in the
litigation context, there are plenty of other cases where personalized default
rules promote accuracy without increasing uncertainty. For example, in our
hypothetical transaction between a firm and a consumer, the firm knows the
terms to which a particular consumer is entitled at the time of the purchase.
The law could require the preservation of these terms, even if the consumer
does not ask to see her personalized default terms. If a subsequent dispute
arises, the court would have as much access to the personalized terms as it
would to the written contract, which means the uncertainty associated with
interpretation would be no greater than normal. Nor is the uncertainty con-
cern serious with regard to our inheritance law example or other cases where
the default rule is tailored according to a salient and easily observable char-
acteristic like sex or age. Where a personalized rule is tailored to a defined
social group (e.g., a default of no organ donation among Shintos), we can
expect group members to learn the contents of the crude personalized de-
fault rule without having to investigate it.168 This brings us to a closely re-
lated objection: case law fragmentation. We turn next to this topic.
financial information used to make purchases over the internet remained a significant impedi-
ment to e-commerce).
166. See supra text accompanying note 150.
167. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979) (discussing “shadow of the law” effects in
the context of divorce).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 57–60.
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E. Case Law Fragmentation
Impersonal default rules minimize the fragmentation of the case law
resolving contractual ambiguity. This is a key advantage. Personalized de-
fault rules, by contrast, would engender greater fragmentation in the legal
precedents. Such fragmentation is a real drawback of judicial determination
of personalized default rules, and this drawback may convince readers that
personalization should be limited to ex ante contexts and that only firms
and specialized agencies—but not courts—should use personalized default
rules.
Presently, if a court interprets ambiguous contractual language, its in-
terpretation will have precedential value and help clarify the law in future
disputes arising out of contractual ambiguity. The precedential effect is most
powerful in any future dispute arising between the same parties concerning
the same ambiguity. In such a case, the earlier precedent has preclusive ef-
fect. Even here, though, the court may construe the same contractual lan-
guage to mean different things if it identifies pertinent differences in the
context of the contract negotiation.169 But the interpretation of language will
certainly play a significant role in mitigating subsequent judicial uncertainty
about the language’s meaning in future disputes.170 Still, the precedent may
help reduce uncertainty with respect to similarly situated parties and similar
contractual ambiguities. To be sure, lawyers and judges will be able to distin-
guish precedents that are closely on point if they are sufficiently motivated
to do so, but the greater the similarities in the contractual language at issue,
the more difficult it will be to distinguish the precedents on contextual or
other grounds.
With personalized default rules, it becomes considerably easier to distin-
guish a precedent that a judge disfavors. Even if the contractual language at
issue in an earlier case is identical to the language at issue in the case before
the court, a party would appropriately argue that the litigant in the earlier
case and the litigant in the current case have sufficiently different personali-
ties, attributes, and profiles to warrant divergent interpretations of the ambi-
guity. No two human beings are identical in every respect, and therefore the
court will have to confront the question of whether litigant heterogeneity
merits a different result in the face of linguistic and contextual homogeneity.
This fragmentation of precedent seems likely to aggravate uncertainty about
the law’s content. Where personalized default rules make this problem par-
ticularly pronounced, they should be regarded more skeptically.
169. See Forbo-Giubiasco S.A. v. Congoleum Corp., 516 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (“The fact that Congoleum used the identical language in the Giubiasco Related Com-
pany Clause as it had used six years earlier in the Krommenie Related Company Clause would
suggest that the two provisions should be interpreted in the same manner only if the same
negotiating context for both contracts existed. However, Congoleum has presented uncontra-
dicted evidence . . . that the understanding between Congoleum and Giubiasco in 1971 was
not the same as the understanding between Congoleum and Krommenie in 1965.”).
170. See, e.g., United States ex rel. B’s Co. v. Cleveland Elec. Co. of S.C., 373 F.2d 585, 588
(4th Cir. 1967).
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The question is ultimately one of tradeoffs, and it is not clear whether
the costs of indirect uncertainty and case law fragmentation exceed the ben-
efits of giving a greater number of individuals default rules that more closely
approximate their preferences than impersonal default rules (if one adopts
the majoritarian default-rule theory). To the extent that readers are con-
cerned about excessive fragmentation, they might support a scaled-back ver-
sion of our proposal, whereby personalized default rules could only be
employed to deal with contractual silence but not with contractual ambigu-
ity. Under this modified approach, identical contractual language would
usually mean identical things to different people, but the absence of a con-
tractual provision would have different implications for different parties.
Courts have occasionally confronted this fragmentation issue before. In
one prominent decision, the Fifth Circuit held that interpreting identical
contractual language to mean different things in different contexts was justi-
fied, despite protests about the extent to which such results would destabilize
existing contracts.171 If such an approach to interpretation is occasionally
permissible when courts are engaged in ex post, holistic analyses of contrac-
tual meaning, then it ought to be even more palatable if undertaken in a
rigorous, data-driven, ex ante way, which is our aspiration in advocating
personalized default rules.172 We therefore conclude that uncertainty and
precedent fragmentation are important but not necessarily decisive consid-
erations in determining the desirability of personalized default rules.
F. Statistics, Stereotyping, and Valuable Default Rules
Another possible objection to our proposal is similar to the one raised
against profiling in law enforcement or, more generally, against using statis-
tical data for determining rights and duties. Statistical data does not focus
on the individual parties; instead, it purports to establish factual findings
and allocate rights and duties by using generalizations about the group to
which the individuals belong, e.g., their sex, age, race, religion, or other
group.173 Such a method may contradict many people’s moral intuitions.
Furthermore, using statistical data creates stereotypes by ascribing to people
attributes they may not have.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the pros and cons of
using statistical data for allocating rights and duties and for law enforce-
ment. We note, however, that any default rule, impersonal or personalized,
171. Hall v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 691 F.2d 1184, 1194–95, 1195 n.19 (5th Cir.
1982).
172. We note in passing that our analysis of personalization has implications for the law of
class-action suits. Class certification is only appropriate under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure if the “claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). As the consumers’ differences become increasingly
regularized and the law comes to depend more heavily on the characteristics of particular
consumers, the proper scope of class-action litigation will be substantially diminished.
173. See Alex Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law 206–07 (2005).
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is statistical in nature because it assigns rights and duties to individuals ac-
cording to the averaged preferences of an entire population or a subset of
people. Personalized default rules are just a better proxy—based on more
accurate statistics—for the preferences of the specific party.
Therefore, the objection to our proposal is not that it uses statistical
data as such—this kind of data should be used regardless of the type of
default rule—but instead that it creates undesirable stereotypes. Take the
intestacy example. Suppose that we use different default rules for men and
women: when there is no will, most of a mother’s estate goes to the children
while most of the father’s estate goes to the children’s spouses. Such default
rules could create (or strengthen) a stereotype that mothers care more about
their children than fathers do. We consider this objection in the next section.
A variation of the objection discussed in this section relates to a subset
of default rules pertaining to values that are central to our life and are not
“mere” preferences. (We hereinafter call this subset of default rules “a funda-
mental values default rule.”) Here, the argument against a personalized de-
fault rule is that because of strong societal interests, only explicit waiver of
the fundamental values default rule should count; this rule cannot be waived
by statistics indicating that a particular person would have opted for waiver
if he had been given the choice. To illustrate this point, let us return to our
implied warranty of habitability example174 and to the question of whether
personalized default rules should be used to leave some tenants without such
a warranty provided they have not opted out of the default rule. If the im-
plied warranty of habitability is a fundamental values default rule, then it
might be appropriate to apply it to everyone regardless of his characteristics,
attributes, and traits, while still respecting explicit opt outs for autonomy
reasons. Note that this attitude could be considered a compromise between
the warranty of habitability as an immutable rule—whereby even an explicit
opt out is invalid—and the warranty as a personalized rule.175
We acknowledge that there could be fundamental values default rules
that render personalized rules undesirable because there is too much at stake
for society for the contracting parties’ preferences to be decisive. Perhaps
individual preferences contribute to a collective action problem or the risk
of error is asymmetric, such that society is more willing to tolerate the prob-
lem of people paying for a warranty they do not want than the problem of
people being denied a warranty that they (unpredictably) badly need. Deter-
mining what counts as a fundamental value default rule will, of course,
prove contentious as well, and different readers may wish to confront these
questions through various frameworks. Put another way, reliance on person-
alized default rules is most appropriate in those settings where the law is
most comfortable deferring to the preferences of the people bound by an
174. See supra Section II.B.4.
175. Cf. Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 Yale
L.J. 2032, 2084–09 (2012) (describing sticky default rules as quasimandatory rules and arguing
that sometimes the law makes opting out of certain default rules hard, but not impossible, in
order to enhance paternalism or prevent externalities).
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arrangement. But domains where the law is uncomfortable with letting indi-
vidual choices govern—whether based on paternalistic grounds, deontologi-
cal grounds, or concerns about collective action or asymmetric risk—
personalized default rules will work less well.
G. Subordination, Adaptive Preferences, and Personalization
Sunstein’s paper on default rules provides an arresting example of an
American default rule that may be simultaneously antimajoritarian and con-
stitutionally compelled. He draws on fascinating work by Liz Emens,176
which notes that overwhelming majorities of American women change their
surnames when they get married but trivial numbers of men do so.177 An
obvious potential implication of these data is that a personalized default rule
is appropriate. Changing one’s name is time consuming,178 but most women
will adopt their husband’s name upon marriage, so the law could just pre-
sume that women adopt their husband’s names while providing an opt out
for women who wish to retain their names or hyphenate their last names.
Men’s default would be no name change, again with an option to override
this default upon request.
Sunstein contemplates the possibility of using a personalized
majoritarian default for women’s marital name changes but then rejects the
idea, noting that “a default rule of this kind would be discriminatory, and it
would almost certainly be found unconstitutional.”179 While Emens does not
deem unconstitutional a waivable default rule presuming women wanted to
change their names, she does argue that compulsory name changes for
women would be unconstitutional,180 and she makes a persuasive feminist
case that state rules increasing the likelihood that women will adopt their
husbands’ surnames are normatively undesirable.181 We will explore the de-
scriptive constitutional claim shortly, but let us first address the normative
issue.
We are sympathetic to Emens’s concerns about pressuring women to
change their names in light of the sexist history of name-changing conven-
tions. We also share her concern that adaptive preferences may be causing
women to change their names.182 These strike us as good reasons for the law
176. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Mari-
tal Names, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (2007).
177. Id. at 785–86; Sunstein, supra note 8, at 25.
178. Emens, supra note 176, at 809.
179. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 34.
180. See Emens, supra note 176, at 774.
181. See id. at 770–77. One can conceptualize Emens’s claim as an argument that the
status quo has appropriately adopted an antimajoritarian, social-welfare-maximizing, imper-
sonal default rule, where gender equality plays a decisive role in the social-welfare calculus.
182. See id. at 775–76.
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to continue employing an impersonal default rule according to which mar-
riage does not entail a surname change.183 Many women will continue to
change their names, overcoming the stickiness of the law’s default term.184
But nearly everything associated with marriage entails undoing a default
choice. The default choice is to remain single. Once one decides to get mar-
ried, the default choice is not to serve food at the wedding, to forgo flowers,
to wear pajamas during the ceremony (or no clothing at all!), and to send no
thank-you notes after receiving gifts. In short, defaults are not really relevant
in these high-stakes settings. The point is simply that if the state adopts a
popular but inegalitarian default, the result may reinforce existing gender
inequality, both because of the power of inertia185 and because of the expres-
sive dimensions of the law.186 We therefore agree with Emens and Sunstein
that a crude personalized default, with gender as the only variable,187 is nor-
matively unattractive.
We think a more compelling case can be made for a granular personal-
ized default rule. If one examines the name change data on which Emens
relies, it is apparent that there are various demographic characteristics that
substantially affect the probability that a spouse will adopt her husband’s
name upon marriage. A study of female Harvard alumnae showed that 20%
of them kept their surnames, whereas a study of the overall population
found that only 10% of married women did so. A more recent study of New
York Times wedding announcements found that 29% of marrying women
whose nuptials appeared in the paper of record were keeping their sur-
names.188 Women with advanced degrees, women who married or became
mothers later in life, graduates of elite universities, daughters-in-law of aca-
demics, and women whose husbands have PhDs were more likely to retain
their surnames.189
Demographic variables affecting name changes interact in somewhat
surprising ways. Education levels were highly predictive of whether Cauca-
sian women would retain their surnames, but education had no effect on
African American women’s choices about keeping their surnames. African
American women generally retain their surnames at significantly higher
rates than Caucasian women do.190
183. Recall that under the default-rule theory that seeks to maximize social welfare, socie-
tal values should be taken into account. See supra Section I.D.
184. Emens, supra note 176, at 813.
185. Id. at 815 (“[A]t least one study of marital names offers anecdotal evidence of a few
women saying that they didn’t change their names because they couldn’t be bothered with the
administrative hassle.”).
186. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1649
(2000); Sunstein, supra note 8, at 20 (discussing the state’s implicit endorsement via default
rules).
187. The crude personalized default would be that men keep their surnames upon mar-
riage, and women adopt their husbands’ surnames upon marriage.
188. Emens, supra note 176, at 786 & n.85.
189. Id. at 787–89.
190. Id. at 788.
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In light of this substantial variation, how should one feel about a highly
granular personalized default rule? Suppose it turned out that Caucasian
women who regularly shop at Wal-Mart, frequently dine at Cracker Barrel,
dropped out of college, and are marrying spouses with similar characteris-
tics adopt their husbands’ surnames 98% of the time but that Asian Ameri-
can women who have a master’s degree in education, subscribe to the
Vegetarian Times and Mother Jones, and take yoga classes adopt their hus-
bands’ surnames only 7% of the time. Would it be normatively undesirable
for the state to adopt as a default rule the assumption that Caucasian women
with these characteristics would see their surnames changed upon marriage
but the Asian American women would not? Imagine if the data showed that
88% of male, vegan, Prius drivers with PhDs in philosophy adopt their
wives’ surnames upon marriage. Why not flip the default for these husbands
to a name change unless they opted out?
The red tape associated with a name change is nontrivial,191 and it may
be that at some point the demographic markers of an individual’s prefer-
ences with respect to name changes are sufficiently strong that we need not
worry so much about the law’s expressive effects. Crude personalized default
rules that are dependent on mere stereotypes are undesirable, but granular
personalized default rules based on hard data and sound science may be
desirable. Indeed, if data miners can drill down and find a set of men whose
names ought to be changed by default, then even the expressive dimensions
of the law may be ambiguous. What is more, the law’s discomfort with rely-
ing exclusively on problematic classifications like race and gender may be-
come less pronounced if these factors are mixed with a number of
nonsuspect classifications to generate a default rule.192
Even crude, gender-based personalized decision rules may be appropri-
ate when the dangers of reinforcing an inegalitarian gender norm are minor.
Nguyen v. INS, a 2001 Supreme Court case, is one of the key precedents
governing the law’s use of gender proxies.193 At issue in Nguyen was a gov-
ernment policy that imposed greater burdens on people seeking American
citizenship who claimed to be the children of U.S. citizens born out of wed-
lock. The illegitimate children of U.S.-citizen fathers born out of wedlock
could only become citizens if their fathers legally legitimated them, if their
fathers declared their paternity under oath, or if a court order determined
their paternity.194 For the mothers, by contrast, maternity was presumed.195
Given the law’s structure, the gender-discriminatory provision func-
tioned as a default rule. While women’s offspring were presumed to be citi-
zens, men had to opt in to citizenship (through a declaration of paternity or
191. Id. at 817–18.
192. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336–41 (2003) (holding that a holistic higher
education admissions process in which race is one of many factors considered survives strict
scrutiny).
193. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
194. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62.
195. Id.
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legitimation) to receive the same rights for their offspring. The Supreme
Court held that the gender classification was justified by two factors: first,
the government’s interest in ensuring that the person claiming citizenship
and the U.S.-citizen father are indeed biologically related and, second, the
state interest in ensuring that the person claiming citizenship has a meaning-
ful relationship with the U.S.-citizen parent and, by extension, with the
United States.196 The majority rejected the idea that its decision was based on
outmoded gender stereotypes:
There is nothing irrational or improper in the recognition that at the mo-
ment of birth—a critical event in the statutory scheme and in the whole
tradition of citizenship law—the mother’s knowledge of the child and the
fact of parenthood have been established in a way not guaranteed in the
case of the unwed father. This is not a stereotype.197
The Court proceeded to hold that placing additional burdens in the path of
the illegitimate children of U.S.-citizen fathers was substantially related to
achieving important governmental objectives.198 The Court emphasized that
“Congress has not erected inordinate and unnecessary hurdles to the confer-
ral of citizenship on the children of citizen fathers in furthering its impor-
tant objectives.”199 The burdens are comparable on an applicant for
citizenship and a woman defaulted into a surname change. The key consid-
erations for a court would be whether accepting a default rule for surnames
that is consistent with most American women’s preferences is “marked by
misconception and prejudice” or shows “disrespect for either class.”200 A
court would also ask whether the preferences in question might be adaptive
and whether they were shaped by a history of patriarchy.
In light of Nguyen, it is not certain that implementing a crude personal-
ized default rule for surname changes upon marriage would be unconstitu-
tional as a positive matter; the question is a close one. We continue to think
that such a rule is undesirable for reasons that feminist legal scholars like
Emens have articulated. Having said that, an advantage of granular person-
alized default rules, as opposed to crude gender-based distinctions, is that it
may be easier to achieve doctrinal unity and popular consensus around such
solutions—at least in a world where people do not care much about infor-
mation privacy. A classic efficiency-versus-equity tradeoff thus arises. Crude
personalized default rules, which conveniently mitigate the uncertainty
problem associated with personalization, compound the constitutional
problems associated with personalization.
We can generalize from Emens’s example of name changes to any legal
regime that incorporates a protected classification like race or gender into a
granular personalized default rule. It is reasonable to survey the history of a
196. Id. at 63–67.
197. Id. at 68.
198. Id. at 70.
199. Id. at 70–71.
200. Id. at 73.
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state’s race and gender discrimination and conclude that such classifications
rarely ought to be part of the state’s efforts to generate default rules. Indeed,
as Sunstein notes, a major variable in determining whether the use of per-
sonalized default rules is appropriate is the trustworthiness of the “choice
architects” who will frame and determine the contents of these rules.201 But
because gender and race can be reliable predictors of current preferences
and future behavior, entirely excluding these variables from an algorithm
leaves a great deal of predictive power on the table.202 Most people would
probably prefer an algorithm that knows their race and gender and, as a
result, more accurately predicts their preferences over a system that excludes
their race and gender from consideration and consequently provides them
with less accurate default rules. Finally, the fragmented nature of the prece-
dents in the gender- and race-discrimination context is important to under-
score. The Supreme Court seems to be animated by different concerns in
race cases than in gender cases, and antidiscrimination law is consequently
far from coherent. While Nguyen’s defaults are the most relevant precedent,
a comprehensive explanation of the constitutionality of personalized default
rules would require a law review article unto itself.
H. Privacy
Information privacy restrictions make it more difficult to generate per-
sonalized default rules.203 Without the ability to track individuals online, ac-
cess comprehensive public and private databases, and use various other Big
Data strategies, it will be quite difficult for firms and courts to generate
personalized default rules. In the European Union, where regulators have
generally taken a more aggressive approach to data privacy than their Ameri-
can counterparts,204 such restrictions could well thwart the development of
personalized default rules.
The privacy literature has long recognized the tradeoffs that information
privacy entails. Scholars have explored the tension between privacy and se-
curity,205 privacy and antidiscrimination,206 privacy and gender equality,207
201. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 8.
202. See In re Estate of Miltenberger, 737 N.W.2d 513, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (“It
remains an unfortunate fact that there are still circumstances in which the surviving wife may
be significantly disadvantaged, in a way that surviving husbands generally are not, in the ab-
sence of dower, and the Legislature may properly consider such circumstances through the
enacted dower statute.”).
203. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 54–55.
204. Paul M. Schwartz, The E.U.-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Proce-
dures, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1966, 1974–79 (2013).
205. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 245
(2008); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 343
(2008).
206. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information and Exclusion 127–56 (2011).
207. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 Yale L.J. 2117 (1996).
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and privacy and innovation.208 We can understand the pri-
vacy–personalization tradeoff in similar terms. One of the unanticipated
consequences of aggressive data-privacy regulations will be a series of shifts
toward impersonal default rules and away from personalized default rules,
from granular personalized default rules to crude personalized default rules,
and (as we shall see) from personalized disclosure to impersonalized
disclosure.
The industry attack on “Do Not Track” rules that would govern the
collection of information about consumers’ internet activities has been
largely focused on the benefits of personalized advertisements to consumers
as well as their obvious benefits to industry. Making consumers aware of the
potential benefits from personalized defaults and personalized disclosure
may, in the long run, prompt fewer consumers to try to thwart tracking.
After all, most consumers bring strongly pragmatic perspectives to privacy
tradeoffs, and they are increasingly willing to share information about them-
selves when the benefits from sharing are increased and the threats from
sharing are diminished.209 There is obviously another potential wrinkle here.
The primary debate over Do Not Track has been about the appropriate de-
fault rules. Industry groups are open to permitting individuals to opt out of
tracking, but they want to require an affirmative step by consumers to reject
a protracking default rule embedded in web browsers.210 Many marketing
firms have said they will not honor Do Not Track requests sent by consum-
ers using Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, which turns on Do Not Track by
default.211
Paradoxically, one way around the current stalemate may be to use our
lack of privacy to further privacy interests. If a consumer’s existing profile
reveals that she cares a great deal about her own information privacy, and if
her behavior mirrors that of guinea pigs who chose to protect their own
privacy online, then it should be straightforward to enable Do Not Track by
default for that consumer. Similarly, if a consumer’s existing profile reveals
minimal concern for privacy and has similar characteristics to those of the
guinea pigs who decided to enable tracking online, then permitting tracking
208. See, e.g., Ethan S. Bernstein, The Transparency Paradox: A Role for Privacy in Organi-
zational Learning and Operational Control, 57 Admin. Sci. Q. 181, 202–04 (2012); Julie E.
Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904, 1918–27 (2013).
209. Alan F. Westin, “Whatever Works”: The American Public’s Attitudes Toward Regulation
and Self-Regulation on Consumer Privacy Issues, Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., http://
www.ntia.doc.gov/page/chapter-1-theory-markets-and-privacy (last visited Mar. 26, 2014); see
also Consumer Intelligence Series, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Consumer Privacy:
What Are Consumers Willing to Share? 1–4 (2012), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/
en/industry/entertainment-media/assets/pwc-consumer-privacy-and-information-sharing.pdf.
Approximately 16% of the American population is privacy unconcerned, with respondents
saying that no corporate uses of their personal information would violate their personal pri-
vacy boundaries. Id. at 8.
210. Natasha Singer, Do Not Track? Advertisers Say “Don’t Tread on Us”, N.Y. Times, Oct.
14, 2012, at BU3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/technology/do-not-track-
movement-is-drawing-advertisers-fire.html.
211. Id.
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ought to be the appropriate default option. Using personalized defaults in
this way is appealing in contexts like online privacy where defaults appear to
be very sticky.212 Note that although enforcing a Do Not Track rule against
firms is costly, it is straightforward to enforce an evidentiary rule limiting
the admissibility of information from tracking to affect the personalized de-
fault rule that applies to a particular consumer. Familiar problems of adverse
selection and unraveling will remain, with bad-credit types and high-pri-
vacy-concern types potentially becoming pooled,213 but this is not a problem
unique to personalization. At the margins, the benefits of personalized de-
fault rules will prompt more consumers to surrender private information, a
development that is positive in efficiency terms but problematic to theorists
who argue that privacy produces positive externalities.214
I. “But I Can Change!” and Opting In
Before turning to a further extension of personalization, we hope to
clarify one last point about our proposal for personalized default rules. Sun-
stein notes that the “best default rules or settings for a particular person in
one year might be very different from those in the next year. The default
rules could change on a daily or even hourly basis.”215 We are skeptical about
the underlying assumptions of this objection. We think that most choices
about default rules are partially driven by values and personality characteris-
tics, which longitudinal research shows to be quite stable once a person
reaches adulthood.216 Personality seems to have a strong genetic component
212. The default provisions contained in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act concerning the
downstream sharing of consumers’ financial information are extraordinarily sticky, with only
one in 200 consumers opting out of the prosharing statutory default. See Edward J. Janger &
Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default
Rules, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1219, 1230 (2002).
213. See Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a
Full-Disclosure Future, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1153, 1177–82 (2011); Strahilevitz, supra note 68, at
2021–22, 2030.
214. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 723 (1999); Paul
M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2055 (2004).
215. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 53.
216. A longitudinal study that tracked people’s personality over a nine-year period from
ages thirty-three to forty-two found very high levels of consistency in each of the Big Five
characteristics among both men and women. See Johanna Rantanen et al., Long-Term Stability
in the Big Five Personality Traits in Adulthood, 48 Scandinavian J. Psychol. 511, 515 (2007)
(showing an average correlation coefficient of .85 for men and .78 for women). Personality
tends to be far less stable across longer periods of time or between young adulthood and late
adulthood, although some studies show correlation coefficients in the .20 to .38 range for
some of the Big Five across decades. See, e.g., Sarah E. Hampson & Lewis R. Goldberg, A First
Large-Cohort Study of Personality-Trait Stability over the 40 Years Between Elementary School
and Midlife, 91 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 763 (2006); Stephen Soldz & George E.
Vaillant, The Big Five Personality Traits and the Life Course: A 45-Year Longitudinal Study, 33 J.
Res. Personality 208 (1999).
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and be heritable.217 That said, we recognize that people sometimes change in
ways that might cause them to want wholesale revisions in their preferences.
We therefore want to underscore that personalization is itself a default rule
that can be waived. Suppose a consumer has a change of heart. She recog-
nizes in the past that she has been risk seeking, inattentive, and price insensi-
tive. A divorce, a bankruptcy, or a stint in rehab convinces her that she
ought to turn over a new leaf. Under our proposal, she need not be stuck
with the choices made by her former self. To escape the consequences of her
consumer profile, she may specify that she rejects personalized defaults. She
can specify that she instead wants to contract for the impersonal
majoritarian default rule, or an impersonal minoritarian default rule, or
randomized selection of default rules, or any other set of decision rules to
which the counterparty might agree. Indeed, with the consent of the
counterparty, a consumer might specify (through a contract) that the con-
tract will be governed by the personalized default rules that would apply to a
(presumably admirably rational) third party. “We hereby reject the
Porat–Strahilevitz proposal for personalized default rules as a basis for inter-
preting this contract” would be a valid and enforceable contractual provi-
sion, as would, “We hereby agree that the promisee shall be entitled to the
personalized default rules that would apply were this to be a contract be-
tween the promisor and Ralph Nader.” Alternatively, we are quite open to
tweaking our proposal so that present-day impersonalized default terms are
the default choice for everyone, and individuals who would like their terms
to be personalized opt into doing so, either with a blanket opt in or particu-
lar opt ins for personalization in discrete settings.
IV. Personalized Disclosure
The question of default rules has long vexed legal scholars and
prompted an enormous academic literature. In the last few years, the topic
of disclosures has become another hotbed of legal scholarship. In their note-
worthy recent work, Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider argue that disclo-
sure to consumers rarely achieves what its advocates claim, in part because
disclosures have a pronounced tendency to become longer and more com-
plicated over time.218 Disclosure mandates accumulate in legislation and reg-
ulations, and, as a result, the disclosures themselves get so lengthy and
cumbersome that consumers stop reading them entirely.
Our personalized-disclosure solution to the problems that Ben-Shahar
and Schneider identify should be obvious to readers by now, and it is sur-
prising that it is an approach largely absent from the broader literature on
217. Kerry L. Jang et al., Heritability of the Big Five Personality Dimensions and Their Fac-
ets: A Twin Study, 64 J. Personality 577, 577 (1996).
218. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 647, 684–90 (2011).
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disclosure. We have already shown how personalization might improve doc-
tor–patient disclosures.219 In this Part, we extend the idea to disclosure more
broadly.
Let us begin with the least controversial form of personalized disclosure:
tailored communicative strategies. Advertisers have long understood that
particular communicative methods might have varying effectiveness in
reaching individuals with divergent personalities. This basic Madison Ave-
nue assumption is buttressed by the available social science research.220 Now
suppose that the government wishes to convey a particular message to the
citizenry in a way that will maximize its impact. Suppose the government
seeks to encourage new parents to put their infants to sleep on their backs to
reduce the risk of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (“SIDS”). Or suppose the
state wants to convince as many people as possible to evacuate from an area
in the path of a Category 4 hurricane, both to reduce the residents’ risk of
death and to minimize the threat to first responders who might have to
rescue those who refuse to evacuate. A government that knows nothing
about its individual citizens’ personalities must broadcast a message de-
signed to appeal to the majority. A government that knows its citizens’ per-
sonalities and can narrowcast to defined groups of individuals with common
traits might tailor the state’s warnings in a way much more likely to per-
suade them.221 Just as it is sensible for the state to use different languages to
communicate with non-English-speaking populations or to tailor to teens
public service ads that are designed to discourage smoking, it is appropriate
for the state to try to use psychological insights to tailor the packaging of
information in a manner designed to prevent the unnecessary deaths of, say,
babies or police officers.
If tailoring the communicative strategy to a group of people with similar
personality traits is uncontroversial, then altering the contents of the mes-
sage should be acceptable as well, as long as all the information provided is
truthful. Where consumers are purchasing items online, we propose a re-
gime whereby their Big Data profiles help determine which disclosures they
see.
The advantages of such a regime are apparent. When online disclosures
occur today, single males who live alone are shown warnings about the ef-
fects that prescription medication may have on pregnant women. Childless
seniors living in age-restricted communities are warned about how house-
hold goods may have small parts that toddlers can break off and swallow.
Devout Mormons are warned about the effects of mixing a particular phar-
maceutical with alcohol. The proliferation of warnings targeted toward a
small set of potential consumers greatly lengthens disclosures, heightening
219. See supra Section II.B.3.
220. See, e.g., Jacob B. Hirsh et al., Personalized Persuasion: Tailoring Persuasive Appeals to
Recipients’ Personality Traits, 23 Psychol. Sci. 578 (2012).
221. Cf. id. at 580 (“Tailored messages are considerably more effective than one-size-fits-
all campaigns, and the effectiveness of tailoring increases with greater customization and adap-
tation to the unique features of the recipient.” (citations omitted)).
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the risk that a consumer will fail to see the one or two warnings that are very
pertinent to people just like him. Too much disclosure can be as bad as too
little disclosure because both result in a consumer retaining too little perti-
nent information. We submit that the disclosure strategy can be rescued and
rejuvenated by a personalization strategy that makes the disclosures each
consumer sees shorter and more relevant.
As technology improves, we would anticipate this sort of personalization
of disclosures occurring even in brick-and-mortar supermarkets, shopping
centers, and hardware stores.222 Twentieth-century disclosure technology in-
volved a printed label with finite space and constraints on how much manu-
facturers could shrink font sizes to cram more information into those
spaces. Twenty-first-century disclosure technology ought to take advantage
of the fact that a significant proportion of consumers now shop with
smartphones that can scan bar codes.223 Personalized disclosure applications
would enable a consumer to scan a product at the point of sale and to see
only the disclosures and warnings likely to be relevant to him. We believe the
health and safety gains from such innovation could be substantial. Personal-
izing disclosures will reduce the time that is wasted when people have to see
irrelevant disclosures and reduce the frequency with which people fail to
notice a key disclosure that is buried amid many irrelevant disclosures.
We believe this proposal for personalized disclosure is novel. Although
we think our idea is intuitive, we are unaware of any academic literature
discussing the prospects of using Big Data to personalize the disclosures that
individuals receive. The new literature on “Smart Disclosure” proposes that
in some contexts, like cell-phone plans or energy usage, vendors would be
required to provide consumers with data about their individual usage pat-
terns, which consumers could then use to compare products and services on
shopping web sites. Armed with this information, consumers could see what
different firms charge customers whose expected use of a service mirrored
theirs.224 Our approach has many of the same virtues, although it aims to be
less cumbersome and therefore more useful to the consumer; it also tries to
mitigate an information overload problem that Smart Disclosure does too
little to solve. Another close cousin in the literature is a recent article by Gil
222. For a thoughtful article exploring possible uses of these technologies in consumer
contracting at the point of sale, see Peppet, supra note 101.
223. Kavita Kumar, Shoppers with Smartphones Put Retailers in Glass Boxes, St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Feb. 15, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/mo-
bile-shoppers-shaking-up-retail-industry/article_4fccd0af-7447-5f2f-8f81-45d52e56520b.html.
224. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Will Tucker, Smarter Information, Smarter Consumers,
Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 2013, at 3; Elisa Brody, Product Attribute Information and Product
Use Information: Smart Disclosure and New Policy Implications for Consumers’ Protection
(Sept. 25, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2142734.
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Siegal, Richard Bonnie, and Paul Appelbaum that discusses personalized dis-
closure in medicine.225 Their version of “personalized disclosure” differs
from ours, and we think it lacks some of the advantages of our approach.
Their first approach to personalized disclosure asks patients at the outset
whether they would like to receive: (a) very detailed and precise disclosure of
side effects and medical risks, including information likely to interest only a
small subset of patients; (b) moderately detailed and general disclosure of
side effects and risks, where minor and insignificant risks are not disclosed
to the patient; or (c) very basic disclosures, such as the reasons for the treat-
ment and the likely period of time the patient will have to miss work.226
They view the patient’s choice about how much disclosure to receive as le-
gally significant: “once a patient has stated his preferences and the procedure
has taken place, he may no longer argue in court that the informed consent
process was inadequate in that it failed to provide him with the information
he needed.”227
Siegal and his coauthors also identify a second form of personalized
disclosure, which they seem to prefer. Under that approach, disclosure
would occur via software that enabled the patient to click on hyperlinks to
find out more about particular risks, side effects, or tradeoffs.228 The
software would record a transcript of what the patient asked to see and did
not ask to see, and this transcript would be admissible evidence in any sub-
sequent litigation over informed consent.229
We think Siegal’s proposal is a step in the right direction, but as Big
Data proliferates and the technologies underlying FICO Adherence Scoring
improve, we think there is a strong case to be made for preferring our ver-
sion of personalized disclosure. Answering many questions about whether
one wants to read a particular paragraph may increase the stress levels of
patients, particularly those who know that by selecting the minimal disclo-
sure option or failing to click on a particular hyperlink they will be waiving
various legal rights. A regime that scrutinizes the choices that representative
guinea pigs have made with the benefit of full information may be a more
sensible way to proceed.230
Indeed, guinea pigs might work differently in the personalized-disclo-
sure context. We envision compensating guinea pigs to read various disclo-
sures and to evaluate (both immediately and several weeks after the
225. Siegal et al., supra note 115, at 359. Peppet’s article has one sentence flagging the
possibility that the warnings a customer sees at the point of sale could depend on the prefer-
ences that the customer previously entered into his smart device. Peppet, supra note 101, at
730.
226. Siegal et al., supra note 115, at 361–62.
227. Id. at 362.
228. Id. at 363.
229. Id. at 364.
230. To the extent that a patient or consumer is informed of the right to opt out, it may
cause some stress, especially during the transition to personalized disclosure. Decisions to trust
guinea pigs will resemble leaps of faith that would decrease as time passes and as consumers
become more comfortable with using guinea pigs’ preferences as proxies.
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treatment at issue) how useful the disclosed information proved to be. Non-
guinea-pig patients would then be paired with the choices made by the
guinea pigs with personalities and attributes most similar to theirs. The key
point is that different warnings will be helpful in different ways to different
sorts of people. Personalized disclosure thus identifies the warnings that
were useful to “people like you” or “people like those in your household”
and only provides you with those warnings unless you opt for more com-
plete disclosure. Parents whose children have peanut allergies will constantly
see peanut-related warnings about products they are considering—including
perhaps an “Are you sure?” message in the checkout line; parents whose own
children do not have allergies but who may be bringing snacks for a kinder-
garten class will need to opt in to receive allergen information when circum-
stances require such additional precautions. We anticipate that these sorts of
personalized disclosures will save consumers a great deal of time. More im-
portantly, however, they will prompt more consumers to read carefully
health and safety disclosures.
We anticipate that such personalized disclosures are likely to take root in
the area of consumer warnings and may spread to other domains as well.
For example, a smartphone application that knows, based on Big Data and
guinea pigs, that you are likely to be concerned about particular sorts of
risks can also learn that you are concerned about particular contractual pro-
visions. Most people may not care about the terms of clickwrap software
agreements, but some users may be sensitive about particular rights, respon-
sibilities, and waivers. Through automation, an application could do what a
good lawyer already does—read the contract and advise the client about
provisions that may be problematic in light of the client’s idiosyncrasies.
Here, again, consumers could benefit from the close scrutiny that compen-
sated guinea pigs would devote to reading all the pertinent contractual
provisions.
Personalization may play a similar role in the context of governmental
disclosures. For example, just as we might want the government to tailor its
warnings about SIDS to audiences with different personalities,231 it may
make sense for the government to target air quality warnings directly to
asthmatics (and their parents) instead of broadcasting such warnings
through mass-media outlets unlikely to pay them much heed. A city govern-
ment that knows our daily commute patterns (because we have agreed to
share them) can let us know about accidents along the route while staying
silent about accidents on other highways in the metropolitan area. Under the
status quo, consumers and voters can always “pull” such information out of
the public sphere, but doing so can be difficult and costly. Personalized dis-
closure may often be the most efficient mechanism for pushing the right
information to the right people, assuming the state can be trusted to put
information about individual citizens to appropriate uses.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 220–221.
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Finally, we think there is an important role to play for personalized dis-
closures in personalizing default rules. Of course, some consumers will re-
spond better than others to the possibility that they are entering into a
contract whose terms are dependent on choices made by others. Consumers
whose profiles suggest that this level of uncertainty is likely to upset them
might receive additional disclosures about anticipated directions of those
changes and be given easy opportunities to reject such changes. Consumers
whose profiles indicate an interest in saving money wherever they can—
even if it means more onerous contractual terms—might receive regular no-
tices about terms that could be modified if the customer wishes to realize a
cost savings. Other consumers, who rarely elect to pay less in exchange for
fewer contractual rights, would receive fewer notices of this kind. In short,
there are many ways in which personalized disclosure could address some of
the complexity problems that arise with personalized contracts. Personalized
disclosures can help consumers determine what their existing profiles indi-
cate about the meaning of a contract they are contemplating signing and
how their profiles are influencing the contractual terms. Where similar
guinea pigs are not unified over which terms are best, the consumer may be
presented with active choices among several default terms or instructions on
how the default might be altered.
While there are many objections to personalizing default rules, we think
that the objections to personalized disclosure are fewer and less significant.
As with default rules, an individual could always request disclosure of a
greater amount of information than what personalization suggests, and we
would want these choices to be honored. Given this possibility, it is hard to
imagine that individuals would engage in strategic behavior to affect the
disclosures to them, and a personalized disclosure regime can easily accom-
modate changes in individuals’ personalities and preferences. Concerns
about cross subsidies do not arise with respect to personalized disclosure,
nor do concerns about uncertainty or fragmentation. And it seems unlikely
that the government would find constitutional objections to personalized
disclosure—the state regularly makes judgments about which messages
should be conveyed to which audiences, and it seems hard to believe that
even race-based messaging, such as extra warnings to African Americans
about the dangers of sickle cell anemia, is constitutionally problematic. The
potential downsides of personalized disclosure, then, seem confined to mis-
givings about stereotyping and privacy. There may also be worries about
whether courts are really willing to countenance the possibility that someone
might not receive a warning about an extremely unlikely side effect of a drug
based on his personality profile and then, due to some fluke, this low-
probability side effect manifests itself.232 In such circumstances, courts
should not award compensation. Social insurance, rather than the tort sys-
tem, is the best mechanism for compensating victims, given the inability of
232. By contrast, we would support legal liability for negligent or reckless profiling that
results in harm because an individual was incorrectly categorized.
1476 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:1417
would-be defendants to reap fully the benefits of nondisclosure resulting
from personalization.
To summarize, we think that personalized disclosures may be the wave
of the future, too. They have the potential to minimize consumers’ informa-
tion-overload problem and to prompt them to start paying attention once
again to pertinent disclosed information. And they even have the potential
to alter, for the better, the way that contracting is done.
Conclusion
The idea of personalized default rules has been in the air for several
decades. Although the origins of our inquiry can be found in Ayres’s essay,
which was published twenty years ago, no one has developed a comprehen-
sive account of personalized default rules. Sunstein took the idea an impor-
tant step further and pointed out some of the main benefits and drawbacks
of a personalized default-rule regime compared with impersonal defaults
and active choices. Our Article, then, has finally developed a comprehensive
framework for understanding the theoretical and practical issues arising in
the implementation of personalized default rules.
Along the way, we have contributed several innovations. For example,
we have shown how providing a limited number of guinea pigs with re-
sources to make rational decisions, and using these guinea pigs’ choices to
generate the default rules that will be presented to the most similar members
of the general public, makes personalization substantially more attractive.
We have explained how majoritarian and minoritarian default rules might
be made more effective through personalization. And we have broken down
the category of personalized default rules into crude personalized defaults
(which are more easily predictable for the parties, applied with more cer-
tainty by adjudicators, less precise, and more impervious to strategic behav-
ior) and granular personalized defaults (which have the opposite costs and
benefits). Perhaps most interestingly, we have shown that personalization
may present an important way forward, not only for default rules but also
for various disclosures to consumers and the citizenry. As we have demon-
strated, the most powerful critiques that have been lodged against disclosure
are largely products of disclosure’s impersonal nature. The disclosure strat-
egy can be resuscitated via personalization.
Why has it taken the literature so long to reach this juncture? We believe
the answer is that until recently, technological constraints would have ren-
dered our approach wildly unrealistic. But the Big Data revolution funda-
mentally changed the equation, at least in the United States. Now more than
ever, implementing a personalized default-rule regime is attainable, and per-
sonalized disclosures are within reach, given minor improvements in the
social science research and applicable technology. Big Data has its own eco-
nomic momentum, but we have endeavored to show how its development
might open up new possibilities for legal intervention. To that end, we call
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on legislatures and courts to respond to the challenge proposed in this Arti-
cle by considering personalized default rules for consumer contracts, con-
tracts between repeat players, inheritance law, medical malpractice, and
landlord–tenant law.
Legislatures should consider tailoring personalized default rules, at least
in those areas when it is quite obvious that the law’s goals could be better
achieved with such rules and where implementing them is feasible and not
too costly. Thus, in inheritance law, intestacy rules should be personalized in
accordance with existing data, provided a bit more research is conducted
about whether the preferences and characteristics of intestates differ from
those of testators of the same gender. Courts hearing medical malpractice
suits should allow doctors to argue that they adopted a disclosure practice
that is consistent with the personal characteristics of their patients, as re-
vealed by FICO Adherence Scores and other data-driven patient profiling
technologies. Courts should also avoid applying constitutional rules devel-
oped before personalization could be contemplated in a manner that suffo-
cates personalized rules in their infancy. Regulators should fund pilot
projects to facilitate personalized disclosure, and legislators might create
safe-harbor provisions to encourage manufacturers, retailers, and service
providers to begin innovating with personalized disclosures in the private
sector.
We realize that personalizing default rules and disclosure is costly. There
is often a tradeoff here, somewhat similar to the rules-versus-standards
tradeoff, between certainty and accuracy: more personally detailed default
rules could increase accuracy but at the same time create uncertainty for
courts applying default rules to disputes and for private actors trying to
anticipate what courts might do. Because the tradeoffs can be significant, we
advocate beginning with personalized default rules in the easiest cases, fol-
lowed by incremental advances if the early results are promising.
Personalized default rules and personalized disclosure are just two im-
portant pieces of a more ambitious idea, which is personalized law in gen-
eral. One could imagine a legal system where criminal law, constitutional
law, tort law, and property law are personally tailored to people’s preferences
and characteristics. Indeed, aspects of these bodies of law are already person-
alized to some degree. Consider insanity defenses or the Sentencing Guide-
lines in criminal law, litigant sensitivity in First Amendment law,233 the
eggshell skull doctrine in tort law,234 and the focus on a landowner’s “dis-
tinct, investment-backed expectations” in takings doctrine. We might antici-
pate far more granular and data-driven personalization in each of these
domains during the coming years. Envisioning such a legal system is beyond
our present project, and the conversation becomes increasingly fraught as
233. See Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First Amendment Law, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1291 (2004).
234. See, e.g., Dennis Klimchuck, Causation, Thin Skulls, and Equality, 11 Can. J.L. &
Jurisprudence 115, 124 (1998).
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the idea is stretched from contract to criminal settings.235 Nevertheless, we
believe the case for trying personalized default rules and personalized disclo-
sure in various contexts is sufficiently compelling to warrant near-term
experimentation.
235. One research paper suggests that juvenile recidivists and nonrecidivists differ signifi-
cantly in terms of Big Five agreeableness and neuroticisms, with repeat offenders scoring
higher on neuroticism and lower on agreeableness. The paper also finds that offenders in
general are less agreeable and less open to new experiences than nonoffenders. Coleta van
Dam et al., PEN, Big Five, Juvenile Delinquency and Criminal Recidivism, 39 Personality &
Individual Differences 7, 14 (2005). If these results are generalizable—the research is very
sparse—they suggest that personality might be relevant in personalizing sentencing and parole
decisions as well as in developing offender profiles. That said, we have normative misgivings
about such an approach to criminal law in light of concerns about stigmatization, incorrect
use, and manipulability. These concerns become particularly forceful in light of personality’s
strong genetic component. See Jang et al., supra note 217, at 577. But if determining personal-
ity through Big Data is relatively straightforward, if personality might predict aspects of crimi-
nality and recidivism, and if the government has access to a large store of data about
individuals, then it is conceivable that governments around the world already employ (or will
soon employ) such techniques.
